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INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that there are approximately half as many ciga-
rette smokers today as there were 35 years ago' before the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA)2 was enacted,
tobacco use is still the greatest health hazard in the United States.3
Consequently, state and local government entities still feel compelled
to find effective ways to curb tobacco use. This has led to the enact-
ment of state and local restrictions aimed at limiting the impact of
tobacco advertising. In response, cigarette manufacturers, retailers,
and advertisers argue that these provisions violate the FCLAA. This
is not surprising, because cigarette manufacturers have effectively used
the FCLAA to their benefit in another context-state law tort
damages claims.4 However, manufacturers' attempts to utilize the
FCLAA as a "shield" against local regulations that restrict cigarette
advertising must be questioned. Similarly, the continued use of the
FCLAA to basically "immunize" cigarette manufacturers from state
law tort damages claims should be reexamined.
These issues center on the FCLAA's preemption provision.' It
is clear that this provision prevents state and local governments from
imposing different warning requirements on either cigarette packages
or cigarette advertising. The courts, however, have construed the pro-
1. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REDUCING TOBACCO USE: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, CDC, OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (2000).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TARGETING TOBACCO USE: THE
NATION'S LEADING CAUSE OF DEATH AT A GLANCE (1999). According to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), some 430,000 people die every year from tobacco use-
that is one in every five deaths. Id. at 2. Tobacco users die from heart disease, different cancers,
and other diseases linked to smoking and chewing tobacco. Id. Further, treating these diseases
results in an annual cost of more than $50 billion in direct medical expenses. Id. Although it has
been acknowledged that cigarette smoking is dangerous to one's health, tobacco use is still the
leading cause of death in the United States. Millions of smokers have quit and many young peo-
ple have decided never to start smoking. Unfortunately, the decline in smoking has leveled off.
Id. See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMO-
TION, STATE SPECIFIC PREVALENCE OF CURRENT CIGARETTE AND CIGAR SMOKING FACT
SHEET (1998).
4. See, e.g., Lacey v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ala. 1997);
Sonnenreich v. Phillip Morris Inc., 929 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1996); Greisenbelk v. American
Tobacco Co., 897 F. Supp. 515 (D.N.J. 1995). All of these cases are discussed in Part I of this
Article.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994).
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vision to prevent certain state law tort damages claims. The courts
have also found the provision applicable to state and local regulations
dealing with tobacco advertising that are unrelated to any warning
requirement.
The number of legal disputes regarding local regulation of
tobacco advertising will probably diminish as a result of the tobacco
settlement. 6 Despite the settlement between major cigarette manufac-
turers and the states, wherein manufacturers have agreed to take down
billboards throughout the country, there will undoubtedly still be
some disputes. In addition to billboards, many of the local restrictions
embrace other types of publicly visible advertising of tobacco prod-
ucts. Further, these restrictions are not just aimed at cigarette manu-
faturers, but cigarette retailers as well.'
During the same period as the tobacco industry settlement, four
federal appellate cases also dealt with both local regulations restricting
tobacco advertising and the FCLAA. The most noteworthy of these
cases was Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department.8 In
Lindsey, the Ninth Circuit found that a local regulation restricting
tobacco advertising was completely preempted by the FCLAA. In
addition to Lindsey, the Seventh Circuit in Federation of Advertising
Industry Representatives (FAIR) v. City of Chicago,9 the Second Circuit
in Greater New York Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani," and
the First Circuit in Consolidated Cigar Corporation v. Reilly" all dealt
with similar regulations. Although these three courts upheld the main
provisions of the regulations at issue in those cases, in each case one
aspect of the regulation involved was found to be preempted by the
FCLAA.
The Ninth Circuit in Lindsey, as well as the three other courts,
purportedly all followed the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," which is the only case in which
the Supreme Court has addressed the preemptive reach of the
FCLAA. Cipollone, however, addressed the preemption issue in a dif-
ferent context: it involved state law tort damages claims brought
against cigarette manufacturers by a plaintiff allegedly injured from
6. Susan Feeney, States Reach Tobacco Pact, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17,
1998, at 1A.
7. There are also questions as to the binding effect of this settlement on these tobacco com-
panies who were not parties to it.
8. 195 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1999).
9. 189 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
10. 195 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1999).
11. 218 F.3d 30(lst Cir. 2000).
12. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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smoking cigarettes. 13 In Cipollone, the cigarette manufacturers raised
the FCLAA's preemption provision as a defense to those claims. 4 A
plurality of the Supreme Court ruled that the FCLAA prevents cer-
tain state law tort damages claims from being asserted against cigarette
manufacturers."5 Following Cipollone, plaintiffs bringing state law tort
damages claims against cigarette manufacturers were consistently
unsuccessful. History now suggests that Cipollone was not the best
decision and that a reexamination of the issue of federal preemption of
state law tort damages claims based on the FCLAA is needed.
Cipollone is probably the main reason why the states found it
necessary to unite in the massive lawsuit against the cigarette industry.
Their efforts resulted in an unprecedented $246 billion settlement
agreement. 16 Cipollone is also most likely the primary reason that the
13. Id. at 508-09.
14. Id. at 510.
15. Id. at 507, 519-20, 524-30.
16. See Feeney, supra note 6. See also Blaylock v. American Tobacco Co. et al., Circuit
Court, Montgomery County, No. CV-96-1508-PR (Ala. 1996); State of Alaska v. Philip Morris,
Inc. et al., Superior Court, First Judicial District of Juneau, No. IJU-97915 CI (Alaska 1997);
State of Arizona v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., Superior Court, Maricopa County, No. CV-96-
14769 (Ariz. 1996); State of Arkansas v. The American Tobacco Co., Inc., Chancery Court, 6th
Division, Pulaski County, No. IJ 97-2982 (Ark. 1997); People of the State of California v. Philip
Morris, Inc., Superior Court, Sacramento County, No. 97-AS-30301 (Cal. 1997); State of Colo-
rado v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., District Court, City and County of Denver, No. 97CV3432
(Colo. 1997); State of Georgia v. Philip Morris, Inc. et al., Superior Court, Fulton County, No.
CA E-61692 (Ga.); State of Hawaii v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Circuit Court, First
Circuit, No. 97-0441-01 (Haw. 1997); State of Idaho v. Philip Morris, Inc., Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict, Ada County, No. CVOC 9703239D (Idaho 1997); People of the State of Illinois v. Philip
Morris, Inc., Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 96-L13146 (I11. 1996); State of Indiana v. Phil-
ip Morris, Inc., Marion County Superior Court, No. 49D 07-9702-CT-000236 (Ind. 1997); State
of Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Iowa District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Polk County,
No. CL71048 (Iowa 1996); State of Kansas v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., District Court of
Shawnee County, No. 96-CV-919 (Kan. 1996); Ieyoub v. American Tobacco Co., 14th Judicial
District Court, Calcasieu Parish, No. 96-1209 (La. 1996); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., Superior
Court, Kennebec County, No. CV 97-134 (Me. 1997); Maryland v. Philip Morris, Inc., Balti-
more City Circuit Court No. 96-122017-CL211487 (Md. 1996); Commonwealth v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc., Middlesex Superior Court, No. 95-7378 (Mass. 1995); Kelley v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
Ingham County Circuit Court, 30th Judicial Circuit, No. 96-84281-CZ (Mich. 1996); State v.
The American Tobacco Co., Inc., Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, No. 9721465 (Mo. 1997);
State v. Philip Morris, Inc., First Judicial Court, Lewis and Clark County, No. CDV 9700306-
14 (Mont. 1997); State v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., District Court, Lancaster County, No.
573277 (Neb. 1997); Nevada v. Philip Morris, Inc., Second Judicial Court, Washoe County, No.
CV97-03279 (Nev. 1997); New Hampshire v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., New Hampshire
Superior Court, Merrimack County, No. 97-E-165 (N.H. 1997); State v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., Superior Court, Chancery Division, Middlesex County, No. C-254-96 (N.J. 1996); State v.
The American Tobacco Co., Inc., First Judicial District Court, County of Santa Fe, No. SF-
1235 c (N.M.); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., Supreme Court of the State of New York, No.
400361/97 (N.Y. 1997); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County,
No. 97CVH055114 (Ohio 1997); State v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., District Court, Cleveland
County, No. CJ-96-1499-L (Okla. 1996); State v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., Circuit Court,
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federal government currently believes it is necessary to pursue rack-
eteering charges against the industry. 17 Moreover, the Cipollone case is
feasibly the chief explanation for the public's frustration, as was
demonstrated in the national record-setting $145 billion punitive
damages j udgment rendered against the cigarette makers in 1999.18
Although Lindsey and Cipollone present different questions re-
garding the applicability of the FCLAA, this Article attempts to
address both.
This Article evaluates Lindsey and other recent cases dealing with
local regulations restricting tobacco advertising; it also examines their
respective preemption analyses, suggesting that the use of the
FCLAA's preemption provision against such regulations is unwar-
ranted. Initially, it must be noted that in Lindsey, the Ninth Circuit
misconstrued the Supreme Court's discussion of the preemptive scope
of the FCLAA by failing to read it in the proper context. Moreover, it
is clear that the FCLAA's preemption provision was not intended to
prevent the particular types of regulations involved in Lindsey and
these other cases. The preemption provision was only meant to pre-
empt health-risk or health-related requirements or prohibitions with
respect to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes, which these
regulations do not involve.
This Article also revisits Cipollone, examines the different posi-
tions taken with respect to the issue of whether the FCLAA preempts
state law tort claims, and concludes that the decision that the
Multnomah County, No. 9706-04457 (Or. 1997); Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc., Court
of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, April Term 1997, No. 2443 (Pa. 1997); Rossello et al.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., U.S. District Court, Puerto Rico, No. 97-1910JAF
(P.R. 1997); State v. The American Tobacco Co., Inc., Rhode Island Superior Court, Provi-
dence, No. 97-3058 (R.I. 1997); State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Court of Com-
mon Pleas, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Richland County, No. 97-CP-40-1686 (S.C. 1997); State v.
Philip Morris, Inc., Circuit Court, Hughes County, Sixth Judicial Circuit, No. 98-65 (S.D.
1998); State v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., U.S. District Court, Central Division, No. 96 CV
0829W (Utah 1996); State v. Philip Morris, Inc., Chittenden Superior Court, Chittenden
County, No. 744-97 and 5816-98 (Vt. 1997); State v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., Superior
Court of Washington, King County, No. 96-2-1505608SEA (Wash. 1996); McGraw v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co., Inc., Kanawha County Circuit Court, No. 94-1707 (W. Va. 1994); State v.
Philip Morris, Inc., Circuit Court, Branch 11, Dane County, No. 97-CV-328 (Wis. 1997).
17. See United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 99-2496 (D.D.C. 1999).
18. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273(A)(20) (Fla. Dade Cty filed May 5,
1994) was a class action brought on behalf of smokers suffering from "diseases like lung cancer
and emphysema" seeking damages against the seven leading tobacco companies, the Council for
Tobacco Research U.S.A. Inc., and the Tobacco Institute, a tobacco-financed public relations
association. The lawsuit alleged that by denying that smoking is addictive and by suppressing
research on the hazards of smoking, the tobacco industry improperly deceived the public about
the dangers of using tobacco products. On July 14, 2000, a jury handed down the largest puni-
tive damage award in U.S. history, ordering the tobacco industry to pay $145 billion to hundreds
of thousands of Florida smokers suffering from diseases caused by cigarettes.
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FCLAA's preemption provision does preempt certain state law tort
damages claims is probably not the best result. Congress never
intended this provision to be used to "immunize" cigarette manufac-
turers from such claims. In addition, state law tort damages claims
serve important functions. Cipollone prevents any regulation of ciga-
rette manufacturers' behavior and any state-imposed obligations
manufacturers owe to their customers. Furthermore, while the states
and federal government are allowed to proceed against cigarette manu-
facturers, individuals, the real victims, are denied the right to seek
compensation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Enactment of the FCLAA and the Amendments Thereto
In 1964, an advisory committee convened by the Surgeon Gen-
eral of the Public Health Service, issued a report that stated as its
central conclusion: "Cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient
importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial
action."19 After that report, the Federal Trade Commission, as well as
several states, moved to impose various warning requirements in the
advertising and labeling of cigarettes.2" The FCLAA, originally
enacted in 1965, was, therefore, a response to a growing awareness that
not only does cigarette smoking pose a significant health threat to
Americans, but also that there are potential problems associated with
different warning requirements in the labeling and advertising of
cigarettes.
The original Act required that the following warning be conspic-
uously placed on cigarette packages: "CAUTION: Cigarette Smok-
ing May Be Hazardous To Your Health."'" The original Act,
however, did not require any warning with respect to cigarette adver-
tising. Section 2 of the Act included an express statement of purpose
that read as follows:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this Act, to
establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette
labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health, whereby-
19. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, U.S. SURGEON GENERAL'S ADVI-
SORY COMM., SMOKING AND HEALTH 33 (1964).
20. See 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964). See also 1965 N.Y. Laws 470.
21. FCLAA, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
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(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette
smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a
warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) pro-
tected to the maximum extent consistent with this
declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, non-
uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertis-
ing regulations with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health.
The original Act also contained an express preemption provision in § 5
that was a blanket provision applicable to federal departments and
agencies, as well as state and local governments, which provided as
follows:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other
than the statement required by section 4 of this Act,
shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be
required in the advertising of any cigarettes the pack-
ages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this Act.23
In 1969, the FCLAA was amended by The Public Health Ciga-
rette Smoking Act of 1969.24 The warning was strengthened to read:
"WARNING: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette
Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health. ' 25 Although the 1969 Act still
did not require a warning on cigarette advertising, it did ban cigarette
advertising in "any medium of electronic communication subject to
[FCC] regulation. '26  Section 5(b) of the preemption provision was
changed to read as follows:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the pack-
ages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sions of this chapter.21
22. FCLAA, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
23. FCLAA, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
24. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1969) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994)). It should be noted that § 10 of the 1965 Act pro-
vided that its provisions affecting the regulation of advertising would terminate in 1969.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
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The portion of the preemption provision relating to advertising, there-
fore, was changed from a blanket provision applicable to both state
and federal entities to one limited in application to state law.
The FCLAA was again amended in 1984 by the Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act,28 which extended the warning requirement to
cigarette advertising and billboards. As a consequence of the 1984
amendment, every cigarette package, advertisement, and billboard was
required to have one of four different warnings.29 The 1984 Act also
amended the first subsection of the FCLAA's statement of purpose in
§ 2 to read: "(1) the public may be adequately informed about any
adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning
notices on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement ..
B. The Prior Case Law Involving the FCLAA, Including Cipollone
1. Banzhaf
The first reported case involving the FCLAA was Banzhaf v.
Federal Communications Commission.3 It dealt with FCLAA's original
preemption provision. Specifically, the case addressed the issue of
whether an action by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) was precluded by that preemption provision.32
Banzhaf considered an FCC ruling requiring radio and television
stations carrying cigarette advertising to devote a significant amount of
broadcast time to presenting the case against cigarette smoking.33 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
the FCLAA did not preempt the field of regulation relating to the
health problems posed by cigarette smoking. Therefore, the court
28. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984)
(codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994)).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1994). The warnings are as follows:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Dis-
ease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risks To Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result
In Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monox-
ide.
The statute further requires the quarterly alternation of warnings. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (1994).
30. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200, (codified as 15
U.S.C. § 1331(a)(1).
31. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
32. Id. at 1087.
33. Id. at 1085-86. This was known as the "Fairness Doctrine."
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held, the FCC had the authority to issue the ruling.34 The court
reasoned that Congress did not intend the FCLAA to curtail the
potential flow of information about the hazards of smoking and that
Congress simply "did not want cigarette manufacturers harassed by
conflicting affirmative requirements with respect to the content of
their advertising. ' 35
As will be noted later, the Banzhaf case was cited in the legisla-
tive history accompanying the 1969 Act when the preemption provi-
sion was amended.3 6 This may provide some explanation as to why
the provision was amended. If the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the
original provision was correct in Banzhaf, this likely meant that it was
possible for states to adopt various regulations similar to the FCC
regulation at issue in that case.
2. Cipollone (Third Circuit)
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.37 presented the question of whe-
ther the FCLAA preempted any or all of the state common law claims
brought by plaintiffs.38 In that case, which would eventually reach the
United States Supreme Court, the plaintiffs, husband and wife, alleged
in their complaint that the wife developed lung cancer by smoking
cigarettes manufactured and sold by the defendants.39 The plaintiffs'
complaint brought forth claims based on strict liability,4" negligence,4
breach of warranty, and intentional tort.42  The cigarette manufac-
turers moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule
34. Id. at 1089-90. This was a direct appeal from the FCC to the appellate court.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 384-89 and 392-93 and accompanying text.
37. 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 183.
39. Id. Both the husband and wife died during the pendency of this litigation. The wife
died first, and the husband continued the prosecution of the action individually and as executor
of her estate. Later, after the husband died, the couple's son became executor of both estates and
maintained the action.
40. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' cigarettes were unsafe and defective, that
the defendants were subject to liability for their failure to warn of the hazards of cigarette smok-
ing on the basis of strict liability, and that the defendants advertised their products in a manner
that neutralized the warning actually provided-warnings made meaningless by the addiction
cigarettes created. Id. at 184.
41. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were subject to liability for their failure to
warn of the hazards of cigarette smoking on the basis of negligence that the defendants negli-
gently advertised their products in a manner that neutralized the warning actually provided. Id.
42. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants intentionally advertised their products in a
manner that neutralized the warning actually provided, those warnings were made meaningless
by the addiction created by cigarettes, and that the defendants ignored, failed to act upon, and
conspired to deprive the public of medical and scientific data reflecting the dangers associated
with cigarettes. Id.
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of Civil Procedure 12(c) based on the preemptive effect of the
FCLAA.43 The district court held that the FCLAA did not preempt
any of the plaintiffs' claims." The Third Circuit allowed an interlocu-
tory appeal and reversed.4"
The Third Circuit reviewed the general principles for ascertain-
ing congressional intent to preempt state authority in its opinion.
46
The court noted that there are two ways Congress can preempt state
law. First, Congress can preempt state law by express statement.47
Second, even without express language, a court can find an implied
intent to preempt.
The court then noted that there are two general ways for a court
to find an implied intent to preempt.48 First, a court may determine
that Congress intended "to occupy a field" in a given area.49 Second,
even where Congress has not wholly superceded state regulation in a
specific area, state law may be preempted "to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law."'  In this second situation, the court
reiterated the Supreme Court's holding that such a conflict arises: (1)
when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,"" or (2) where state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."12 The Third Circuit, however, emphasized that "in apply-
ing these principles, a court must be mindful of the overriding
presumption that 'Congress did not intend to displace state law."'5 3
In applying the preemption principles in Cipollone, the Third
Circuit concluded that Section 1334 did not expressly preempt plain-
43. Id. at 183.
44. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-70 (D.N.J. 1984).
45. Cipollone, 789 F.2d 181. The opinion of the Third Circuit appears to address only the
preemptive effect of the amended preemption provision. The United States Supreme Court,
however, later found that the original preemption provision was at issue in the case as well.
46. Id. at 185.
47. Id. (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)).
48. Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)).
49. Id. As explained by the Third Circuit, this is
because 'the scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,' because 'the
Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject,' or because 'the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the char-
acter of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.'
Id. (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982)).
50. Id. (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 304 (1982)).
51. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963)).
52. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
53. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981)).
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tiffs' common law claims. 4 The court also concluded that while Con-
gress intended to "occupy a field," it was constrained to say that
"Congress intended to supercede entirely private rights of action such
as those at issue here.""5 The Third Circuit, however, did find a prob-
lem when it looked to the extent to which the plaintiffs' state law
claims "actually conflicted" with the FCLAA.56 The court first noted
that it accepted the defendants' assertion that the duties imposed
through state common law tort actions have the effect of creating
requirements that are "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'" The court also
noted a number of Supreme Court cases where there was recognition
of the regulatory effect of state law tort claims and their potential for
frustrating congressional objectives.58 The court
conclude[d] that claims relating to smoking and health that
result in liability for noncompliance with warning, advertise-
ment and promotion obligations other than those prescribed in
the [FCLAA] have the effect of tipping the [FCLAA's] balance
of purposes" and therefore actually conflict with the[FCLAA] .60
The Third Circuit did not identify which specific claims asserted
by the plaintiff were preempted by the FCLAA.6" The court held,
however, that
the Act preempts those state law damage actions relating to
smoking and health that challenge either the adequacy of the
warning on cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's ac-
tions with respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes
[and] ... where the success of a state law damage claim neces-
sarily depends on the assertion that a party bore the duty to
54. Id. at 185.
55. Id. at 186. The court indicated that it could not say that the scheme created by the
FCLAA was not "so pervasive" or the federal interest involved "so dominant," as to eradicate all
of plaintiffs' claims. Id. The court also indicated that it could not say that the object of the
FCLAA and the character of obligations imposed by it revealed a purpose to exert exclusive
control over every aspect of the relationship between cigarettes and health. Id.
56. Id. at 187.
57. Id.
58. See id. (citing Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982);
Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981); San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).
59. The primary purposes of the FCLAA are to warn the public of the hazards of cigarette
smoking and to protect national economic interests. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
60. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
61. The court stated that it was not necessary for it to identify them at that stage of the liti-
gation. Id. at 187-88.
[Vol. 24:763
Federal Preemption and the FCLAA
provide a warning to consumers in addition to the warning Con-
gress has required on cigarette packages...
3. Stephen, Palmer, Roysdon and Pennington
Shortly after the Third Circuit's decision in Cipollone, four other
federal circuits issued decisions following it: the Eleventh Circuit in
Stephen v. American Brands, Inc.;63 the First Circuit in Palmer v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc. ;64 the Sixth Circuit in Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. ;6 and the Fifth Circuit in Pennington v. Vistron Corp.66 All four of
these cases addressed the issue of whether state tort claims are
preempted by the FCLAA. All four were actions brought against
cigarette manufacturers in which the plaintiffs challenged the ade-
quacy of the warnings on cigarette packages. Each of the four circuits
found that there was no express preemption present. However, like
the Third Circuit in Cipollone, these courts also found that the
FCLAA impliedly preempted the plaintiffs' claims.67
4. Cipollone (U.S. Supreme Court)
After the Third Circuit rendered its first decision in Cipollone,68
the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari69 and
the case returned to the district court. The district court found that
the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn, express warranty, fraudulent- misrepre-
sentation, and conspiracy-to-defraud claims were barred by the
FCLAA ° to the extent that they relied on the defendants' advertising,
promotional, and public relations activities after January 1, 1966, the
62. Id. at 187.
63. 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987).
64. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1988).
65. 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
66. 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989).
67. See Stephen, 825 F.2d at 313 (adopting the decision and reasoning of the Third Circuit
in Cipollone); Palmer, 825 F.2d at 625 (holding that the FCLAA impliedly preempted the plain-
tiffs' state law tort claim); Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 234 (agreeing with the Third Circuit in Cipollone
and the First Circuit in Palmer and finding that the plaintiffs' state law failure to warn claim was
implicitly preempted because it "actually conflicted" with the FCLAA); Pennington, 876 F.2d at
418, 421 (concluding that the FCLAA did not expressly preempt the plaintiffs products liability
claims but that a failure to warn claim "conflicts with Congress' [sic] clear intent to impose uni-
form warning and labeling requirements" and "upsets the congressional balance between warn-
ing the public of the risks of cigarettes and protecting the national economy.").
68. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
69. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
70. Although the district court did not find that the plaintiffs' design-defect claims were
preempted by the FCLAA, the court found that they were barred on other grounds. See Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 669-72 (D.N.J. 1986).
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effective date of the FCLAA.7' The case was thereafter submitted to a
jury which, in essence, rejected all the fraudulent misrepresentation
and conspiracy claims but found that the defendants had breached
their duty to warn and their express warranties before 1966.72 After
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's preemption rulings,73
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
preemption issue.74
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the pre-
emptive scope of both the original and the amended preemption provi-
sions.75 With respect to the original preemption provision, a majority
of the Supreme Court held that the FCLAA did not preempt state
common law damages actions, but superseded only positive enact-
ments by state and federal rulemaking bodies mandating particular
warnings on cigarette labels or in cigarette advertisements.76 A
plurality of the Court then held that the amended provision pre-
empted plaintiffs' failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation
claims to the extent that they relied on omissions or inclusions in the
defendants' advertising or promotions, but that the amended provi-
sions did not preempt the express warranty or conspiracy claims at
all. 77
A majority of the Supreme Court supported parts of the opinion
discussing the general principals of preemption analysis and the
FCLAA's preemptive scope.7" The Court began by acknowledging
that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States [are] not to be superseded by ... a Federal Act unless that [is]
71. Id. at 669, 673-75.
72. The jury, however, found that the wife "[had] voluntarily and unreasonably encoun-
tered a known danger by smoking cigarettes" and that 80% of the responsibility was attributable
to her. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 554 (3d Cir. 1990) (summarizing the
jury's findings). Consequently, no damages were awarded to her estate, although the jury
awarded damages to compensate her husband for losses caused by the defendants' breach of
express warranty. Id. at 554-55.
73. The court of appeals did, however, remand for a new trial on several other issues not
related to the preemption issue. See id.
74. Cipollone, 499 U.S. 935 (1991). The Supreme Court later indicated that it granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict between this case and the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990), see infra notes 157-67 and ac-
companying text, which held that the FCLAA's amended preemption provision did not preempt
similar common law claims. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504, 508-09.
75. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 514-15.
76. Id. at 518-19.
77. This resulted in the Supreme Court reversing in part and affirming in part the judg-
ment of the court of appeals. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509.
78. Id. at 516-20 (Parts III and IV of the opinion).
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the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."79 This is because '[t]he
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of preemption
analysis."80 The Court continued to explain that
Congress' intent may be 'explicitly stated in the statute's lan-
guage or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. '81 In
the absence of an express congressional command, state law is
preempted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if
federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it. '82
The Supreme Court noted that the Third Circuit was not per-
suaded that the amended preemption provision encompassed state
common law claims or that either preemption provision "revealed a
congressional intent to exert exclusive congressional control over every
aspect of the relationship between cigarettes and health. '8 3  The
Supreme Court then responded to the Third Circuit's conclusion that
Congress had impliedly preempted plaintiffs' claims, challenging the
adequacy of the warnings on labels or in advertising, or the propriety
of the manufacturers' advertising and promotional activities as
follows:
In our opinion, the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act and the
1969 Act is governed entirely by the express language in § 5 of
each Act. When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emp-
tion and has included in the enacted legislation a provision
explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision prvides
a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to
preempt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legisla-
tion. Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a
provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted. In this case, the
other provisions of the 1965 and 1969 Acts offer no cause to look
beyond § 5 of each Act. Therefore, we need only identify the
domain expressly pre-empted by each of those sections.84
The Supreme Court then discussed each of the two preemption
provisions separately. A majority of the Court found that the original
79. Id. at 516 (brackets in original) (citations omitted).
80. Id. (brackets in original) (citations omitted).
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 516-17.
84. Id. at 517.
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preemption provision, which, "on [its] face, . . . merely prohibited
state and federal rulemaking bodies mandating particular cautionary
statements on cigarette labels (§ 5(a)) or in cigarette advertisements (§
5(b)), s85 ... was best read as having superseded only positive enact-
ments" and therefore did not preempt state-law damage actions.86 A
plurality of the Court then found that the amended provision was
much broader," reaching beyond positive enactments to encompass
certain common law claims.88 The plurality concluded that those
common law claims containing a legal duty predicated on a "require-
ment or prohibition based on smoking and health.., imposed under
State law with respect to ... advertising or promotion" were pre-
empted.89
In determining whether the amended provision preempted the
plaintiffs' common law claims, the plurality analyzed each of the
claims individually. The plurality began with plaintiffs' failure to
warn claims, which asserted "two closely related theories."9 The first
theory was that defendants "were negligent in the manner they tested,
researched, sold, promoted, and advertised" their cigarettes. 1 The
second theory was that defendants failed to provide "adequate warn-
ings of the health consequences of cigarette smoking."92 The plurality
held that insofar as either theory required a showing that the defend-
ants' advertising or promotions should have included additional, or
more clearly stated warnings, it was preempted.93 The plurality, how-
ever, found that plaintiffs' claims that relied solely on defendants'
testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or
promotion were not preempted.9 4
The plaintiffs' claim for breach of an express warranty arose
under a state law that provided: "Any affirmation of fact or promise
made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise."9' The
85. Id. at 518.
86. Id. at 518-19.
87. Id. at 520 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.). The plurality explained that this was
because it barred not simply statements, but rather any "requirement or prohibition.., imposed
under State law." Id.
88. See id. at 520-24. The plurality specifically noted that its ruling did not mean all com-
mon law claims were preempted. Id. at 523.
89. Id. at 523-24.
90. Id. at 524.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 524-25.
95. Id. at 525 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-313(1)(a) (West 1962)).
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plurality noted that the district court below ruled that this claim
"inevitably brings into question defendants' advertising and promo-
tional activities, and is therefore preempted. '"96 The plurality, how-
ever, disagreed and found that the FCLAA's amended preemption
provision did "not sweep so broadly," explaining as follows:
The appropriate inquiry is not whether a claim challenges the'propriety' of advertising and promotion, but whether the claim
would require the imposition under state law of a requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to adver-
tising or promotion.
A manufacturer's liability for breach of an express warranty
derives from, and is measured by, the terms of that warranty.
Accordingly, the 'requirement[s]' imposed by an express war-
ranty claim are not 'imposed under State law,' but rather
imposed by the warrantor.97
The plurality further noted:
That the terms of the warranty may have been set forth in ad-
vertisements rather than in separate documents is irrelevant to
the pre-emption issue (though possibly not to the state-law issue
of whether the alleged warranty is valid and enforceable)
because, although the breach of warranty claim is made 'with
respect... to advertising,' it does not rest on a duty imposed
under state law.9"
The plaintiffs in Cipollone also alleged two theories of fraudulent
misrepresentation.99 The first theory alleged that the defendants,"through their advertising, neutralized the effect of federally man-
dated warning labels.""1°  The plurality found that this claim was"predicated on a state-law prohibition against statements in advertis-
ing and promotional materials that tend to minimize the health
hazards associated with smoking.""0 Because the later preemption
provision encompasses both requirements and prohibitions, this the-
ory was preempted.0 2 The second theory alleged that the defendants
engaged in intentional fraud and misrepresentation both by "false
representation of a material fact [and by] conceal[ment of] a material
96. Id. (citing Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 675).
97. Id. (emphasis original).
98. Id. at 526 (parentheses in original).
99. Id. at 527.
100. Id.
101. Id. The plurality noted that this was "merely the converse of a state-law requirement
that warnings be included in advertising and promotional materials." Id.
102. Id.
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fact. "103 With respect to plaintiffs' second theory of fraudulent misre-
presentation, the plurality held: (1) that plaintiffs' claims that defend-
ants concealed material facts were "not preempted insofar as they rely
on a state-law duty to disclose such facts through channels of com-
munication other than advertising or promotion' °4 and (2) that even
such claims that did arise with respect to advertising and promotions
were not preempted since they "[were] predicated not on a duty 'based
on smoking and health' but rather on a more general obligation-the
duty not to deceive."'
Lastly, the plaintiffs in Cipollone claimed a conspiracy among the
defendants to misrepresent or conceal material facts concerning the
health hazards of smoking.0 6 Since the plurality found that "[tihe
predicate duty underlying this claim [was] a duty not to conspire to
commit fraud," the plurality held that this claim was not preempted,
as it was not a prohibition "based on smoking and health" as that
phrase is properly construed.0 7
It is important to note that only four of the Justices agreed with
the above holding with regard to the FCLAA's amended preemption
provision.' 8 Three of the Justices found that there was no preemp-
tion0 9 based on the amended provision and the remaining two Justices
thought that this provision preempted all of the common law claims."0
5. Lacey, Sonnenreich, Griesenbeck, and Cantley
After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone,
plaintiffs in state law tort damages actions were unsuccessful in assert-
ing claims against cigarette manufacturers, despite their attempts to
avoid preemption. In Lacey v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc.,' the court
held that common law claims for the manufacturers' failure to disclose
information regarding cigarette ingredients were preempted by the
FCLAA."' In Sonnenreich v. Philip Morris Inc.,"' the court found
that the FCLAA preempted the plaintiffs claim that cigarette manu-
103. Id. at 528 (brackets original).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 528-29.
106. See id. at 530.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 507 (Stevens, J. plurality opinion, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White, &
O'Connor, J.J.).
109. Id. at 531 (Blackmun, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Thomas, J.). It should be noted that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would also have found
that the original preemption provision preempted the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims.
111. 956 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
112. Id. at 964.
113. 929 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
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facturers had a duty to employ "nonpromotional communications" in
order to inform the public of the dangers of cigarette smoking. 114 In
Griesenbeck v. American Tobacco Co.,"' the court held that the plain-
tiff's claim under a state products liability statute, that a cigarette
manufacturer should have warned that smoking while sitting on up-
holstery when drowsy is dangerous, was preempted by the FCLAA,
rejecting the plaintiff's assertion that Cipollone applies to advertise-
ments and promotions pertaining only to smoking and health rather
than to the safety issue of self-immolation through negligence." 6 In
Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.,.. the Alabama Supreme Court deter-
mined that plaintiffs fraudulent suppression claim was merely a claim
for failure to warn and was therefore preempted by the FCLAA."'
6. Vango Media
In Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York," 9 a city ordinance
required that a minimum of one public health message be displayed
for every four tobacco advertisements displayed on certain property
and facilities licensed by the city, including taxicabs. 2° A company in
the business of displaying advertising signs on the exterior of city
taxicabs challenged the ordinance. 2' Finding that the phrase "with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes" in the
FCLAA's amended preemption provision must be given a broad
meaning, the Second Circuit'22 held that the ordinance was pre-
empted,.2 . since requiring the company and similar businesses who
display cigarette advertising to also display anti-smoking messages,"treads on the area of tobacco advertising" and "implicates § [5](b)."' 24
In so ruling, the court rejected the city's argument that its ordinance
imposed no requirements or prohibitions on the content, format, or
display of cigarette advertisements and therefore was beyond the scope
of § 5(b).'25 The Second Circuit remarked that had the original pre-
114. Id. at 418.
115. 897 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1995).
116. Id. at 823-24.
117. 681 So. 2d 1057 (Ala. 1996).
118. Id. at 1061.
119. 34 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1994).
120. Id. at 70.
121. Id. at 70-71.
122. The Second Circuit is the court that later decided Giuliani.
123. Since the appellate court only addressed the ordinance as it applied to advertising
space on privately-owned property and not its application to property owned or operated by the
city, the court held that the ordinance was preempted as applied to the plaintiff and those sim-
ilarly situated. Id. at 71.
124. Id. at 74.
125. Id. at 73-74.
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emption provision been in effect, it might have been persuaded by the
city's argument, but it could not be persuaded now because of the
more expansive reach of the current provision. 126 Interestingly, the
regulation in Vango Media is similar to the FTC's regulation in
Banzhaf, which, as noted herein, 127 might have been the impetus to
amend the preemption provision.
7. Penn Advertising
Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore,128 dealt with a regulation similar to those at issue in Lindsey,
FAIR, Giuliani, and Reilly and was discussed in detail in each of those
cases. In Penn Advertising, a city ordinance prohibited the placement
of any sign that "advertise[d] cigarettes in a publicly visible loca-
tion. , 21 In that case, the Fourth Circuit purportedly used the same
methodology prescribed by the plurality in Cipollone, finding that the
regulation was not preempted by the FCLAA based on a "location"
versus "content" distinction. 30
8. Harshbarger
In Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger,131 cigarette manufacturers
and smokeless tobacco manufacturers brought a preemption challenge
under the FCLAA and the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
126. Id. at 74.
127. See supra notes 36, infra notes 384-89, and 392-93 and accompanying text.
128. 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 518 U.S. 1030
(1996), readopted as modified on remand, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996).
129. Id. at 1321. "Publicly visible location" included outdoor billboards, sides of build-
ings, and freestanding signboards. Id. at 1321 n.1.
130. The court explained its finding as follows:
Applying the methodology described in Cipollone, to [the ordinance], we conclude
that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act does not preempt the ordi-
nance. [The ordinance] limits only the location of signs that advertise cigarettes, but
it does not address the content of such advertisements. The ordinance neither im-
poses a duty nor relieves a burden on cigarette advertisers based on smoking and health.
Moreover, the ordinance does not limit the ability of cigarette manufacturers to adver-
tise generally in the media. The regulation simply restricts the location of cigarette-
advertising signs, irrespective of the nature of the message communicated. A regula-
tion with such a general relationship to cigarette smoking-in contrast to a specific
advertising 'prohibition based on smoking and health'-is not preempted by the Fed-
eral Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. Were the preemption provision to be
interpreted so broadly, the Supreme Court in Cipollone could not have allowed the
continued prosecution of common law claims for breach of express warranty, misre-
presentation, intentional fraud, and conspiracy-all of which relate generally to the
effects on health of promoting the sale of cigarettes.
Id. at 1324 (referencing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)) (emphasis origi-
nal).
131. 122 F.3d 58 (st Cir. 1997).
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Health Education Act of 198632 (the Smokeless Tobacco Act) in refer-
ence to a state statute that required manufacturers of tobacco products
to disclose the additive and nicotine-yield ratings of their products to
the state's public health department.'33 The district court held that
the state statute was not preempted by either the FCLAA'34 or the
Smokeless Tobacco Act, 35 and the First Circuit affirmed. 3 6 The First
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-08 (1994).
133. Specifically, the state law required "any manufacturer of cigarettes, snuff or chewing
tobacco sold in the [state]" to provide the State Department of Public Health with a yearly report
that lists for each brand of product (1) any added constituents "in descending order according to
weight, measure, or numerical count," and (2) nicotine yield ratings "which shall accurately pre-
dict nicotine intake for average consumers." Harshbarger, 122 F.3d at 62 (citing MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (1996)). Under the statute, the information provided was deemed a "public
record," although the health department was prohibited from revealing the information "unless
and until the [state] attorney general advises that such disclosure would not constitute an uncon-
stitutional taking." 122 F.3d at 62. Despite this limitation, it appears that the health department
would have made the information publicly available and that the statute's purpose was "to fur-
ther the public health and education in the use of tobacco products." Id.
134. In addition to the warning messages that are required on cigarette packages and adver-
tisements, the FCLAA contains an ingredient reporting provision that requires cigarette manu-
facturers to "annually provide the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] with a list of the
ingredients added to tobacco in the manufacture of cigarettes which does not identify the com-
pany which uses the ingredients or the brand of cigarettes which contains the ingredients." 15
U.S.C. § 1335a(a) (1994). Under this provision
[a]ny information provided to the Secretary under subsection (a) of this section [must]
be treated as trade secret or confidential information subject to section 552(b)(4) of
Title 5 [providing a trade secret exemption for disclosure under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act] and section 1905 of Title 18 [criminalizing disclosure of confidential
information by federal officers or employees] and [cannot] be revealed, except as pro-
vided in paragraph (1) [respecting the Secretary's required report to Congress], to any
person other than those authorized by the Secretary in carrying out their official
duties.
15 U.S.C. § 1335(b)(2)(A) (1994). Further, the ingredient reporting provision requires the Secre-
tary to ensure the confidentiality of the provided information through specified procedures,
including a designated custodian of the information who, when the information is not in use,"shall store it in a locked cabinet or file" and must keep a record of those inspecting or using the
information and a requirement that persons "permitted access to the information [must] be
instructed in writing not to disclose the information to anyone who is not entitled to have access
to the information." 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(b)(2)(C) (1994).
135. The Senate Report explains that the Smokeless Tobacco Act, "for the most part, sim-
ply extends the provisions of ... the [FCLAA], to include smokeless tobacco products." S. REP.
No. 99-209, at 1 (1986). It contains features similar, but not identical to, the FCLAA. The
Smokeless Tobacco Act establishes a rotating warning requirement for package labels and adver-
tising, with specific warnings regarding the potential adverse health effect of smokeless tobacco
products. The specific texts of the alternative warnings, all preceded by the word "WARN-
ING," read:
THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER.
THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH LOSS.
THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO CIGARETTES.
15 U.S.C. § 4402(a)(1) (1994). The Act bans the advertising of smokeless tobacco on radio and
television. See 15 U.S.C. § 4402(f) (1994). Similar to the FCLAA, the Act provides for anony-
mous and aggregate ingredient reporting to the Secretary of Health and Human Services; it also
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Circuit found that the state statute was not expressly preempted by
the FCLAA. 137  Although the disclosures were a requirement or pro-
hibition based on smoking and health imposed under state law, they
were not imposed with respect to advertising or promotion of any cig-
arettes. 13' The court further concluded that there was no implied
preemption, an argument the manufacturers based largely on the
FCLAA's ingredient reporting provisions. 131
Harshbarger is the one case involving the FCLAA and the issue
of federal preemption that involved neither state law tort damages
actions nor local regulations restricting cigarette advertising.
provides for the Secretary's handling of the information. The Smokeless Tobacco Act, like the
FCLAA, has an express preemption provision. There are, however, two noteworthy differences
in the preemption provision of the Smokeless Tobacco Act. First, unlike the FCLAA, the
Smokeless Tobacco Act contains a "savings clause." It provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall
relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other per-
son." 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c) (1994). Second, the preemption provision in the Smokeless Tobacco
Act makes it clear that there is no preemption of outdoor billboard advertisements. The Smoke-
less Tobacco Act's preemption provision reads as follows:
No statement relating to the use of smokeless tobacco products and health, other than
the statements required by section 4402 of this title, shall be required by any State or
local statute or regulation to be included on any package or in any advertisement (un-
less the advertisement is an outdoor billboard advertisement) of a smokeless tobacco
product.
15 U.S.C. § 4406(b) (1994) (parentheses original).
136. 122 F.3d at 87.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 69-77. The appellate court found that the issue of whether the Smokeless
Tobacco Act expressly preempted the state statute was a much simpler one because the wording
in that preemption provision read in pertinent part: "No statement relating to the use of smoke-
less tobacco products and health, other than the statements required by [this act] shall be
required by any State or local statute or regulation to be included on any package or in any adver-
tisement.., of a smokeless tobacco product." Id. at 77. The court found the phrases "on any
package" and "in any advertisement" dispositive to the issue before it. Id.
139. The First Circuit found that it was bound by the majority's holding in Cipollone that §
5(b) governed the preemptive scope of the 1965 and 1969 versions of the FCLAA and stated it
"was not at liberty to address any implied preemption theories based solely on" those versions.
Id. at 78. The court noted that the ingredient reporting provisions, however, were added to the
FCLAA in 1984 by the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200
(1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41) and were not at issue when the United States Supreme
Court rendered its opinion in Cipollone. Id. See 122 F.3d at 78 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at
508). The First Circuit stated that it was only engaging in implied preemption analysis to the
extent that the manufacturers were relying on the 1984 amendments to the FCLAA. See 122
F.3d at 78.
The First Circuit concluded that the statute did "not impede either purpose expressed in §
1331 because it neither obstructs the congressionally mandated warning labels, nor... impedes
the national economy by imposing a diverse or nonuniform advertising regulation." Id. at 82.
The court further concluded that the purpose of the reporting provisions was to further toxico-
logical research not to effect some type of national uniformity in ingredient reporting and dis-
closure regulations. Id. at 85.
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9. Chiglo
Chiglo v. City of Preston, Minnesota is a good illustration of a
local regulation restricting cigarette advertising that was aimed pri-
marily at retailers, not manufacturers. In Chiglo,4° the operator of a
convenience store brought suit challenging the legality of a city ordi-
nance that prohibited all "point of sale" advertising in retail estab-
lishments and only allowed stores to display small signs stating that
cigarettes were for sale.' The statute prohibited the display of brand
names, trademarks, or logos on the signs, although the sign could con-
tain information about the "tar" and nicotine content of the products,
as well as their price.'42 The district court found that the ordinance
was preempted by the FCLAA 43 The court noted that unlike the
ordinance in Penn Advertising, the ordinance in Chiglo regulated the
content of advertisements. 44
10. Forster
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 4' was a state case that
would be cited in the United States Supreme Court's Cipollone deci-
sion.'46 In that case, the plaintiff, a smoker who had developed lung
cancer, sued both the manufacturer and retailer of cigarettes alleging
strict products liability, misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and
negligence. 47  The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendants finding that the plaintiffs claims were preempted by the
FCLAA, but the court of appeals reversed, holding there was no fed-
eral preemption. The court of appeals disagreed with the federal
circuit courts' approach to preemption, finding that in such cases the
traditional presumption against preemption is "heightened" by the
following four factors: (1) the FCLAA did not explicitly preempt
state tort claims; 14 (2) the matter involved the state police powers of
protecting the health and safety of the public;' (3) the legislative
140. 909 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1995).
141. Id. at 676.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 678.
144. Id.
145. 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
146. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509 n.3.
147. See Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 656-57. The plaintiff purportedly began smoking in 1953,
therefore, both the original and current preemption provisions of the FCLAA were at issue in
this case.
148. Id. at 656.
149. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
rev'd 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
150. See 423 N.W.2d at 696-98.
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history of the FCLAA, which the federal appellate court completely
disregarded in Cipollone, indicated that Congress did not intend to
supersede the traditionally state-run area of tort compensation; 15 and
(4) given its drastic consequences, preemption would effectively elim-
inate all means of recourse for the plaintiff.5 2 Based on those factors,
the state appellate court concluded that "at the very heart of [its] rul-
ing [was] the firm conviction that if there [was] a need to immunize
the tobacco industry from tort liability, that decision must be made by
Congress in an unambiguous mandate and not by the courts."''
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.5 4 The court
held that state tort claims based on a state-imposed duty to warn are
impliedly preempted while other state tort claims are not.' The court
reasoned that the imposition of state tort damages for failure to warn"would directly conflict with one of the announced purposes of the
[FCLAA], namely, to avoid 'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing reg-
ulations relating to cigarette smoking and health, and would effectively
dismantle the federal plan."' 56
11. Dewey
In Cipollone, the United States Supreme Court indicated that it
granted certiorari because that case and other federal decisions follow-
ing it were in conflict5 7 with the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'5 8 In Dewey, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the FCLAA did not preempt state claims
against cigarette manufacturers for failure to warn, design defect, or
fraud and misrepresentation in advertising.5 9 The trial court in that
case concluded that the Third Circuit's decision in Cipollone "com-
151. Id.at698-99.
152. Id. at 700.
153. Id.
154. 437 N.W.2d at 662. The court found that neither the original nor the current pre-
emption provision expressly preempts a state common law tort action and that the issue before it
was whether federal preemption was to be implied. Id. at 658. The court specifically noted that
"the phrase 'requirement or prohibition... imposed under State law' was too obscure for [it] to
say that it [was] an express declaration that state common law tort actions are preempted." Id.
155. Specifically, the court held that plaintiffs claim of strict liability for unsafe design and
defective condition were not preempted by the FCLAA. With respect to the misrepresentation
claim, the court found that as long as the plaintiff did not claim that the advertising was decep-
tive because it did not adequately warn, the claim was not preempted. The court also found that
to the extent a breach of warranty was based on a duty to warn it was preempted; otherwise it
was not. Similarly, to the extent negligence was claimed to be a breach of the duty to warn about
the hazard of smoking, it was preempted. Id. at 662.
156. Id. at 659.
157. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1992).
158. 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990).
159. See id. at 1251.
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pelled" a finding that the claims for failure to warn, fraud, and misre-
presentation were preempted, and the intermediate appellate court
agreed.16° After noting that decisions of the lower federal courts are
not "binding on state courts,"'61 the New Jersey Supreme Court dis-
agreed with the appellate court's conclusion in Cipollone, as well as
with the other courts following it,162 that state law claims for inade-
quate warning "actually conflict" with the purposes of the FCLAA.163
As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained:
We agree with those courts that hold that the [FCLAA] neither
expressly preempts common-law remedies nor impliedly pre-
empts those remedies by pervasively occupying the field of law.
Nor is there any indication that compliance with both state and
federal law is impossible. We part company, however, with the
cited cases to the extent that they conclude that state-law claims
for inadequate warning "actually conflict" with the purpose of
the [FCLAA]. 64
The court then discussed preemption by actual conflict, stressing that
"[a]ctual conflict must be more than 'hypothetical' or 'potential.' 1 61
After considering the purpose of the FCLAA, 66 the New Jersey
Supreme Court refused to accept the assumption that the regulatory
effect of state law damage claims necessitated the preemption of the
plaintiffs claims. 167
160. Id. at 1241. The trial court, however, like the Third Circuit in Cipollone, did not find
that the design defect claim was preempted by the FCLAA.
161. Id. at 1244.
162. Id. at 1246-48.
163. Id. at 1247.
164. Id. at 1247 (citing Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 418-21 (5th Cir. 1989);
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234; Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825
F.2d 620, 625-26 (1st Cir. 1988); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 185-87 (3d
Cir. 1986); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 659-60 (Minn. 1989)).
165. See Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1247-48.
166. For this, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied upon the FCLAA's express statement
of purpose found at 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). The court also made the following two observa-
tions with regard to the two purposes announced in the statement. See id. at 1248. First, the
court found it "significant that the second goal, the protection of trade and commerce, must be
achieved 'consistent with' and not 'to the detriment of' the first and principal goal-to inform the
public adequately that cigarettes may be hazardous to health." Id. Second, the court noted that
"the secondary goal focuses on the need for uniform labeling and advertising regulations as a way
of protecting commerce and the national economy, but does not go so far as to restrict the rights
of injured consumers." Id.
167. Id. at 1249. The New Jersey Supreme Court did a thorough examination of other
contexts in which the United States Supreme Court commented on the regulatory effect of state
damage actions where the question of preemption was present. Id. at 1248-51. The court even-
tually concluded that if Congress intended to immunize cigarette manufacturers from these
claims, "it knew how to do so with unmistakable specificity." Id. at 1251.
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12. Mangini
The California Supreme Court decided Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company168 after the United States Supreme Court decision in
Cipollone. In Mangini, a consumer sued a cigarette manufacturer and
its advertising agencies for injunctive relief, asserting claims of unfair
business practices and unjust enrichment in connection with the
manufacturer's advertising campaign, which was allegedly targeted at
minors. 169 The California Supreme Court rejected the manufacturer's
argument that because its cigarettes were labeled in conformity with
federal law, it could not be subject to such claims because the claims
would be based on underlying health concerns in violation of the
FCLAA 7 ° The court found that Congress did not intend to affect
the power of the state with respect to the sale of cigarettes to minors171
and therefore it "surely" did not intend to preempt attempts to pro-
hibit the advertising of cigarettes directed at minors as well.'72
This case is noteworthy because the California Supreme Court
rejected the argument that health concerns underlie laws prohibiting
selling or furnishing cigarettes to minors. 173  The court noted that
these laws existed long before the current health concerns regarding
cigarettes and that it was the states' protective role, not health
concerns, that primarily motivated such prohibitions.174
II. FAIR, GIULIANI, LINDSEY, AND REILLY
A. FAIR
In Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives (FAIR) v.
City of Chicago,175 the plaintiff, a group of advertisers, brought an
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against a city ordinance
that restricted the public advertisement of cigarette and alcohol prod-
ucts. 7 6 The ordinance essentially banned all publicly visible advertis-
ing of tobacco products and then carved out several exceptions. 77
168. 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994).
169. Id. at 74. The advertising campaign featured a cartoon character known as "Joe
Camel."
170. Id. at 79.
171. As will be noted later herein, this is in the legislative history accompanying the 1969
amendment to the FCLAA.
172. See Mangini, 875 P.2d at 81.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 189 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
176. Id. at 634.
177. Id.
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Exceptions included signs located near highways, in certain commer-
cial and manufacturing zoning areas, at certain sports facilities, and
inside stores licensed to sell alcohol and cigarette products, as well as
signs on commercial vehicles transporting such products, and signs
identifying the premises where such products were sold.'78 The ordi-
nance also specifically exempted any sign that contained a generic
description of cigarettes or alcoholic beverages. 9
In its complaint, the plaintiff contended that the ordinance
violated the First Amendment, the Contracts Clause, and the Due
178. Id. at 635 n.1. The text of the ordinance read as follows:
(a) No person may place any sign, poster, placard or graphic display that advertises
cigarettes or alcoholic beverages in a publicly visible location. In this section, "pub-
licly visible location" includes outdoor billboards, sides of buildings, and freestanding
signboards. This section shall not apply to:
1. (A) With respect to cigarettes, the placement of signs, including advertise-
ments, inside any premises used by a holder of a license required by chapter 4-
64 of this code; or (B) With respect to alcoholic beverages, the placement of
signs, including advertisements, inside any premises used by a holder of a license
required by chapter 4-60 of this code; or (C) On commercial vehicles used for
transporting cigarettes or alcoholic beverages;
2. (A) With respect to cigarettes, any sign that contains the name or slogan of
the premises used by a holder of a license required by chapter 4-64 of this code
that has been placed for the purpose of identifying such premises; or (B) With
respect to alcoholic beverages, any sign that contains the name or slogan of the
premises used by a holder of a license required by chapter 4-60 of this code that
has been placed for the purpose of identifying such premises;
3. Any sign that contains a generic description of cigarettes or alcoholic bever-
ages;
4. (A) With respect to cigarettes, any neon or electrically charged sign on pre-
mises used by a holder of a license required by chapter 4-64 of this code that is
provided as part of a promotion of a particular brand of cigarettes; or (B) With
respect to alcoholic beverages, any neon or electrically charged sign on premises
used by a holder of a license required by chapter 4-60 of this code that is pro-
vided as part of a promotion of a particular brand of alcoholic beverage;
5. Any sign at a special event, as that term is defined in section 10-8-335 of this
code;
6. Any sign on a CTA vehicle;
7. Any sign on property owned, leased or operated by the Illinois Sports Facil-
ities Authority;
8. Any sign at Comiskey Park, Soldier Field, the United Center, or Wrigley
Field;
9. Any sign on property adjacent to an interstate highway; or
10. Any sign located in a C3 District (Commercial-Manufacturing), a C4 Dis-
trict (Motor Freight Terminal) or any M District (Manufacturing).
(b) This section shall not be construed to permit any display that is otherwise restrict-
ed or prohibited by law.
(c) The penalty for violation of this section shall be as set forth in section 11.13 of this
Title.
FAIR, 189 F.3d at 635.
179. Id.
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Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 181 It also alleged
that the ordinance was preempted by the FCLAA and by state law.' 81
On the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, the district court
held that the FCLAA preempted the ordinance's cigarette advertising
restrictions and that the regulation of alcohol advertising was not
severable from the preempted regulation of cigarette advertising.112
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the ordinance was not
preempted by the FCLAA to the extent that its provisions served as
land-use regulations (including those provisions relating to cigarette
advertising).183 The court did find that the provision of the ordinance
permitting "generic" advertising of cigarettes without regard to any
land-use consideration was preempted by the FCLAA.8 4 The appel-
late court, however, found that this preempted portion of the ordi-
nance was severable, under state law, from the remaining portions of
the ordinance.185
The court began its preemption analysis with the Supreme
Court's Cipollone decision."8 6 The court noted that in Cipollone the
Court stated that the preemptive scope "is governed entirely by the
express language in § 5 of [the FCLAA]."' 7 The Seventh Circuit,
however, found that it "[was required to] examine the congressional
scheme and legislative history of § 5(b) [of the FCLAA] in order to
determine what Congress meant by [the] broad language." '88
180. Id. at 634.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 635-36.
183. Id. at 639-40.
184. Id. at 640.
185. The court of appeals therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of
the district court below. Id.
186. Id. at 636.
187. Id. at 637.
188. Id. The appellate court noted that "every opinion in Cipollone... relied on legislative
history, historical context, legislative purpose, or analysis of the statutory provisions as a whole in
interpreting the scope of the preemption mandated by the language of § 5(b) of the [FCLAA]."
Id. The appellate court also noted that since Cipollone, the Supreme Court clarified this issue in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). Id. In Medtronic, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that although Cipollone stated that the scope of the preemption statute must begin with its
text, that interpretation "does not occur in a contextual vacuum" and "is informed by two pre-
sumptions about the nature of pre-emption." Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484-85. The court went on
to explain the Supreme Court's discussion of the two presumptions. FAIR, 189 F.3d at 637. As
the court explained:
First, [the Supreme Court] noted that, 'because the States are independent sovereigns
in our federal system,' there has been a presumption that 'Congress does not cava-
lierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.' This presumption, remarked the Court, is
especially applicable when Congress legislates in areas traditionally occupied by the
historic police powers of the state. Second, continued the [Supreme] Court, in deter-
mining whether Congress has preempted such activity, the purpose of Congress must,
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The Seventh Circuit then examined the FCLAA in light of the
statute's congressional goals."89 The court found "two important man-
ifestations of congressional intent that shed light on the scope of § 5(b)
preemption in this case." 9' The first was the express statement of the
purpose of the FCLAA."9' The court noted that the FCLAA's "legis-
lative history confirm[ed] that the preemption provision was adopted
'to avoid the chaos created by multiplicity of conflicting regula-
tions. '"'192 The second was the fact that "[t]he Senate Report refer[red]
to § 5(b) as 'narrowly phrased' and not intended to touch state author-
ity over sales to minors, taxation, indoor smoking, or 'similar police
regulations."' 193 The court concluded that the preemption provision
must be read "in light of Congress' desire not only to ensure uniform-
ity of regulation with respect to matters of labeling and advertising,
but also in light of the manifest congressional concern in preserving
for the states the remainder of their traditional police powers. '
The question for the court was whether the ordinance at issue
was "the type of police regulation of local concern that Congress
intended to preserve.""' The court found that the ordinance was
basically a land-use regulation, 196 and noted that land-use has tradi-
tionally been within the police powers of states and municipalities. 9 '
Thus, the court concluded that the ordinance was within the tradi-
tional local police power that Congress wished to preserve under the
FCLAA. 198
The Seventh Circuit found that its conclusion that the ordinance
was within the traditional local police power that Congress wished to
preserve did not end its inquiry.' 9  Another question remained as to
"the effect of the [o]rdinance on the federal interest in uniformity of
labeling and advertising regulations." 200  As the court explained,
in every case, be 'the ultimate touchstone.' That intent is discerned, continued the
Court, from the language of the Act, the statutory framework and the structure and
purpose of the Act as a whole.
Id. (citations omitted). Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that it could not limit its
analysis solely to the language of§ 5(b). Id. at 637-38.
189. 189 F.3d at 638.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-566, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 638-39.
196. Id. at 639.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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"[t]his inquiry requires that we focus on the precise sort of regulation
that the [o]rdinance requires and determine whether compliance with
the [o]rdinance will frustrate or burden the purpose of the federal
statute. '21' The court determined that except in one minor respect,
the ordinance would not pose any problem.
The court found that the ordinance provisions regulating the
location and type of signs "create[d] no danger of interfering with the
FCLAA's advertising and labeling requirements., 212  These provi-
sions were, therefore, not preempted by the FCLAA. As noted ear-
lier, the court did, however, find that the provision of the ordinance
that permitted "a generic, as opposed to brand-specific, mention of a
tobacco product[,]" without any consideration of location, "[ran]
squarely into the prohibition of the [FCLAA.] '' 203 It was therefore,
preempted by the FCLAA. °4
Despite the court's finding with regard to the one aspect of the
ordinance, the other provisions in the ordinance were upheld.205 This
included those provisions that regulated the location and type of signs
relating to cigarette advertising.
B. Giuliani
In Greater New York Metropolitan Food Council, Inc. v. Giuli-
ani,2°6 the city enacted an ordinance entitled the "Youth Protection
Against Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act." The ordinance
prohibited most outdoor advertising of tobacco products (other than
tobacco advertisements on motor vehicles) within one thousand feet of
any school building, playground, child day care center, amusement
arcade, or youth center. It also prohibited most indoor advertising in
the same areas if the advertisements could be seen from the street.
The ordinance contained one exception to the ban: a single, black-
and-white, text-only "tombstone" sign stating "TOBACCO PROD-
UCTS SOLD HERE" could be placed within ten feet of an entrance
to a store where tobacco products were sold.
The plaintiffs, various supermarket and advertising associations,
brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
city's mayor and two other city officials responsible for enforcing the
ordinance. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. The appellate court found that the invalid provision could properly be severed from
the ordinance under state law. 189 F.3d at 640.
206. 195 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1999).
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alleging that: (1) the ordinance was preempted by the FCLAA and
therefore violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution; and (2) the ordinance unconstitutionally restricted commercial
speech in violation of the First Amendment. On cross motions for
summary judgment, the district court, relying on Vango Media,0 7
found that the ordinance was preempted by the FCLAA.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the FCLAA only par-
tially preempted the ordinance. The court determined that only the
ordinance's "tombstone" provision was preempted. The court found
that the ordinance's remaining restrictions on advertising within a
thousand feet of a school, playground, etc., were not preempted.0 8
The court of appeals started its analysis with the FCLAA's
preemption language in amended § 5(b), which states as follows: "No
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes, the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this chapter. ,29 The appellate court found that "this
text provides little insight into the preemptive scope intended by
Congress," explaining as follows:
The ambiguity resides primarily in the open-ended language
extending preemption to obligations "with respect to" advertis-
ing and promotion of cigarettes. Read literally, these words
could be misunderstood to preempt every conceivable obligation
having a relationship-however evanescent-to the advertising
and promotion of cigarettes., 210
The court went on to note:
[T]his hyper-literal approach would yield results that Congress
surely did not intend. To take an absurd example, it could
divest states and municipalities of authority to prevent tobacco
advertisers from posting their ads in public buildings even
though smoking is legally prohibited there. Or to borrow
another example mentioned by our sister circuit, it could lead to
the conclusion that 'states [are] without power to prohibit a
cigarette company from handing out free cigarettes in an
elementary school yard.'211
207. For a discussion of Vango Media, see supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
208. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the judgment insofar as it held that the
tombstone provision of the ordinance was preempted under the FCLAA and reversed insofar as
it held that the remaining provisions of the ordinance were preempted.
209. Id. at 105 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994)).
210. Id.
211. Id. (quoting FAIR, 189 F.3d at 638).
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The appellate court determined that it could not read the FCLAA's
preemption language in that fashion.212  Looking beyond the
FCLAA's preemption provision, the court emphasized that "'the
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone,' and [that] an overly-
expansive literal interpretation could subvert the presumption against
preemption. ' '113
The Second Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit in FAIR, cited to
the express statement of purpose in § 2 of the FCLAA.214 The Second
Circuit found that in this statement, "Congress has provided valuable
insight into the intended scope of preemption under the FCLAA."21
As the court explained:
Two conclusions emerge when this statement is read in conjunc-
tion with the FCLAA's other provisions. First, Congress
sought to inform the public about the dangers of smoking by
regulating advertising and labeling information.... Second,
recognizing the potential burdens on the national economy that
might result from the proliferation of 'diverse, nonuniform and
confusing' advertising standards, Congress reserved to itself the
power to regulate cigarette advertising information.216
The court found the FCLAA's legislative history indicated preemp-
tion was needed "to avoid the chaos created by a multiplicity of con-
flicting regulations. 21 7
With respect to the preemption issue, the Giuliani court found
that § 5(b) must be read in the context of. "(1) Congress's 'compre-
hensive Federal program' to control cigarette advertising information;
and (2) its concomitant concern with avoiding 'diverse, nonuniform,
and confusing' advertising standards."21  The court concluded that
one provision of the ordinance at issue presented problems in that
212. See id. at 105-06.
213. Id. at 106. The court of appeals found that the district court was wrong to interpret
the appellate court's prior decision in Vango Media as suggesting it could not look beyond the
FCLAA's preemption language or consider congressional intent. See id. According to the
appellate court, while the analysis of § 5(b)'s preemptive scope in Vango Media began with the
language of the provision, the court did consider the stated purpose of the FCLAA, its historical
context, or its legislative history. Id. The court further emphasized that it "noted [in Vango
Media] that § [5](b)'s 'with respect to' language connotes a potentially expansive preemptive
scope," and that in that case it "gave effect to that language only because [they] found that doing
so would implement congressional intent." Id. "[The legislative purpose underlying § [5](b), as
discerned not only from the language of that provision, but also from other indicia of congres-
sional intent." Id.
214. Id. at 106 (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)).
215. Id.
216. Id. (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
217. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-566, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663).
218. Id. at 106-07.
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regard: the tombstone provision, which limited advertising infor-
mation in the restricted areas to black-and-white signs stating
"TOBACCO PRODUCTS SOLD HERE" and prohibited colors,
nontextual images, and nonconforming messages. 219  This provision"create[d] obligations directly pertaining to the nature and content of
advertising information" that "risked the sort of 'diverse, nonuniform,
and confusing' advertising standards that Congress sought to
avoid. '22' The court held that the tombstone provision was a"requirement... based on smoking and health... with respect to
advertising or promotion of cigarettes ' ' 12' and was therefore preempted
under § 5(b).
The Second Circuit reached a different conclusion as to the
remaining provisions of the ordinance, which essentially regulated the
physical placement of advertising. The court cited the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in FAIR and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Penn
Advertising and held that the remaining provisions of the ordinance at
issue were not preempted.222 Specifically, the court found "that these
location restrictions do not impose obligations 'with respect to' adver-
tising as that phrase is used in § 5(b). ' 223 The court explained:
[The ordinance's] location restrictions do not implicate the same
concerns as the ordinance's tombstone provision or the ordi-
nance in Vango Media. The location restrictions do not touch
upon Congress's "comprehensive Federal program" to control
cigarette advertising information. The restrictions do not, for
example, burden advertisers with a duty to warn. Nor do they
impose content and format requirements on advertising infor-
mation.
Instead, those provisions restrict only the physical placement of
tobacco advertising signs in a manner akin to a run of the mill
zoning regulation. To be sure, [the ordinance's] restrictions are
unusual in that they ban only signs advertising tobacco, and not
other products. However, the disparity does not interfere with
the congressional purpose underlying the FCLAA. We do not
219. Id. at 107.
220. Id.
221. Id. The appellate court rejected the city's argument that the tombstone provision was
not "based on smoking and health" within the meaning of § 5(b), but instead aimed solely at pro-
moting law enforcement-the prevention of illegal sales of tobacco products to children. Id. at
108. The court noted the references in the legislative history of the ordinance to "health" and
combating the danger of smoking. Id. The court also noted that "the effect of [the ordinance]
was clearly to promote health because the underage tobacco sales prohibitions whose enforce-
ment it explicitly seeks to promote are inherently based on health concerns." Id.
222. Id. at 109.
223. Id.
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see-and the [plaintiffs] do not explain-how mere location
restrictions can lead to the sort of "diverse, nonuniform, and
confusing" advertising standards that Congress sought to avoid
when it enacted § [5](b).224
While the Second Circuit found that the tombstone provision of
the ordinance was preempted by § 5(b), the court found it was sever-
able from the rest of the ordinance under state law.22' The remaining
provisions of the ordinance were therefore valid and enforceable.
C. Lindsey
In Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department,226 a com-
bined city-county health department board (the "Board") adopted a
resolution banning all tobacco advertisements that could be seen from
the street unless the advertisements were presented in a tombstone
format.227  Under the resolution's tombstone exception, licensed
tobacco retailers could post price and availability information outside
their businesses as long as the advertisements were in plain black type
and on a white field without adornment, color, opinion, artwork, or
logos. 228 No tombstone advertisement, however, could be displayed if
it was visible from a school, school bus stop, bus stop, or sidewalk
regularly used by minors to get to school, or within one thousand feet
of a school, playground, or public park. 2 9  The resolution did not
regulate tobacco advertisements located inside retail establishments
unless the advertisements could be seen from the street.23°
The plaintiffs, owners of convenience stores that were licensed to
sell tobacco products in the state, filed an action against the Board and
certain Board employees alleging that the resolution was (1) pre-
empted by the FCLAA; (2) an unconstitutional regulation of commer-
cial speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution; (3)
preempted by state law; and (4) an impermissible exercise of the legis-
lative authority beyond the Board's statutory authority. The district
court granted summary judgment for the Board, reasoning that (1)
the resolution was not preempted by the FCLAA because it only reg-
ulated the location and not the content of cigarette advertisements; (2)
224. Id. (emphasis original).
225. Id.
226. 195 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1999).
227. Id. at 1067.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1067-68.
230. Id. at 1068.
231. Lindsey v. Tacoma Pierce County Health Dep't, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (W.D. Wash.
1998).
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the resolution was a constitutional regulation of commercial speech
under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion232 because it was sufficiently related to the purpose of reducing
underage tobacco use and because nonspeech alternatives to the regu-
lation did not exist; (3) the resolution was not preempted by state law
because the resolution did not directly regulate indoor advertising; and
(4) the Board did not exceed its authority when it adopted the resolu-
tion because the resolution was reasonably related to the Board's
authority to enact regulations that promote and improve public health.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court found that the
district court erred when it concluded that the FCLAA did not
preempt the resolution. 33 The court held that the Board's ban on out-
door tobacco advertising was preempted by the FCLAA and granted
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their federal preemp-
tion claim.
After a general discussion of preemption,234 the Ninth Circuit
noted,
[f]ederal preemption [can] occur when (1) Congress enacts a
statute that explicitly preempts state law; (2) state law actually
conflicts with federal law; or (3) federal law occupies a legislative
field to such an extent that it is reasonable to conclude that Con-
gress left no room for state regulation in the legislative field.235
The court, however, also found that "[w]hen Congress considers the
issue of preemption and adopts a preemption statute that provides a
reliable indication of its intent regarding preemption, the scope of fed-
eral preemption is determined by the preemption statute and not by
the substantive provisions of the legislation. "236 The court relied com-
pletely on the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone for this finding.
The court noted that in Cipollone, the Supreme Court indicated that
"Congress' enactment of a provision defining the preemptive reach of
a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not preempted." '237
Further, as the Supreme Court found in Cipollone, the Ninth Circuit
232. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
233. 195 F.3d at 1075.
234. Id. The Ninth Circuit began its preemption analysis noting that "[i]ssues of federal
preemption arising under the Supremacy Clause... 'start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... [a] Federal Act unless that [is] the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Id. at 1069 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947). The appellate court, citing Cipollone, also specifically recognized that con-
gressional intent was the 'ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis." Id.
235. Id. (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516).
236. Id. (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
237. Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
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concluded that the federal preemption issue in its case was .' governed
entirely by the express language' of the FCLAA's preemption
statute. 238
Despite the court's suggestion that the scope of preemption was
determined solely by the preemption provision and not by the sub-
stantive provisions of the legislation, it did note the dual purpose of
the FCLAA. 239 The court also discussed the original version of the
FCLAA's preemption provision,24 finding that the amended version
of the FCLAA's preemption provision expanded its scope.241  The
court concluded that now "[t]he plain language of the FCLAA pre-
empts any state law that imposes a requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health with respect to cigarette advertising.
242
The court also determined that the express language of the
FCLAA preempted the Board's resolution banning outdoor tobacco
advertising in the county because the resolution imposed a "require-
ment or prohibition" that was "based on smoking and health" "with
respect to cigarette advertising. ' 243 The court found that the resolu-
tion was a "requirement or prohibition" because it expressly pro-
hibited outdoor tobacco advertising in the county and also imposed a
requirement on cigarette advertising, in that it required certain adver-
tisements to be printed in the tombstone format.244 The court also
found that the resolution was based on "smoking and health" because
of statements by the Board that the resolution "pertain[ed] to matters
of health and safety of the citizens of [the] [c]ounty" and because the
findings included in the resolution to justify the ban on outdoor tobac-
co advertising extensively referred to the various health risks related to
cigarette smoking.248 Lastly, the court found that the resolution was"with respect to cigarette advertising" because it expressly prohibited
outdoor tobacco advertisements and regulated point-of-sale availabil-
ity information.246
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Board's attempted reliance on the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Penn Advertising, which held that a city
ordinance prohibiting the placement of any sign advertising cigarettes
238. Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
239. Id. ("To inform the public about the possible dangers of smoking... [and] [t]o pre-
vent diverse regulations.").
240. See id.
241. Id. at 1070.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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in a publicly visible location was not preempted by the FCLAA.247
The court found that Penn Advertising misconstrued Cipollone in
reaching its conclusion because the ordinance in that case regulated
the location rather than the content of cigarette advertisements-it was
not based on smoking and health.248  The court also noted that the
Seventh and Second Circuits in FAIR and Giuliani turned to the con-
gressional purpose behind the FCLAA for their conclusion that loca-
tion restrictions do not lead to the "diverse, nonuniform, and confus-
ing" advertising standards that Congress aimed to prevent by the
FCLAA. 49 The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by this, explaining
as follows:
The distinction between location and content regulations is not
only unsupportable by reference to the text, but the Congres-
sional purpose of § 5(b) supports the preemption of a ban on
247. Id. at 1071.
248. The Ninth Circuit explained as follows:
In Cipollone, the [Supreme] Court had to determine whether state common law
actions filed against tobacco companies for failure to warn, breach of warranty, fraud-
ulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy were preempted by the FCLAA. A plurality
of the court addressed each common law claim individually stating that "(tihe central
inquiry in each case is straightforward: we ask whether the legal duty that is the predi-
cate of the common-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health... imposed under State law with respect to ... advertising or
promotion,' giving that clause a fair but narrow reading." The plurality opinion
expressly recognized that the plain language of the FCLAA is determinative in reso-
lution of preemption issues regarding tobacco advertising.
The plurality held that failure to warn claims were preempted by the FCLAA to
the extent that such claims required a plaintiff to show that tobacco advertisements
should have included additional or more clearly stated health warnings. The plurality
reasoned that such failure to warn claims were preempted because they relied on 'a
state-law requirement or prohibition ... with respect to... advertising or promotion.'
The plurality noted, however, that failure to warn claims based on negligent testing
and research practices were not preempted by the FCLAA because such claims were
unrelated to advertising and promotional practices.
The plurality concluded that express warranty claims were not preempted by the
FCLAA because liability for express warranty is imposed, not under state law, but by
the warrantor's express actions. The plurality also concluded that the FCLAA did
not preempt fraudulent misrepresentation claims because fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion claims are based on a state law duty not to deceive rather than a state law duty
"based on smoking and health." Likewise, the plurality concluded that the FCLAA
does not preempt conspiracy to defraud claims because such claims are based on a
duty not to conspire to commit fraud rather than a duty "based on smoking and
health." The Cipollone plurality always examined the plain language of the FCLAA
to determine preemption issues and never recognized a distinction between content
regulations and other regulations like location regulations. The [b]oard's argument
and the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that location regulations are distinguishable from
content regulations under the FCLAA are, therefore, not supported by the plurality
decision in Cipollone.
Id. at 1071-72 (citations omitted) (emphasis original).
249. Id. at 1072.
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outdoor tobacco advertising. As noted in Giuliani, advertisers
are forced to comply with diverse local zoning laws; however,
this fact does not justify placing additional restrictions solely on
tobacco advertisers. Rather, the failure to preempt location
restrictions on tobacco advertising will place an unjustifiable
burden upon a tobacco advertiser to consult local regulations
concerning the placement of tobacco advertisements in every
locality in which it wishes to advertise.250
The Ninth Circuit claimed that the conclusion that location reg-
ulations could not be distinguished from content regulations under the
FCLAA was supported by the fact that the earlier version of the pre-
emption provision only preempted content regulations and that the
amended language broadened the scope of preemption beyond content
regulation. 21 The court also maintained that "[i]n order to distinguish
the language currently used in § [5](a), from the language currently
used in § [5](b), § [5](b) must be read as preempting more than just
content regulations. 252
D. Reilly
Consolidated Cigar Corporation v. Reilly,23 which was decided
after Lindsey, Guiliani and FAIR, involved certain regulations promul-
gated by the state attorney general restricting the sale, promotion, and
labeling of tobacco products in an effort to reduce the use of such
products by minors. The regulations outlawed certain promotional
techniques that purportedly invite illegal tobacco use by minors254 as
well as:
(a) Outdoor advertising, including advertising in enclosed sta-
diums and advertising from within a retail establishment
that is directed toward or visible from the outside of the
establishment, in any location that is within a 1,000 foot
radius of any public playground, playground area in a
public playground, playground area in a public park,
elementary school or secondary school;
250. Id. The court went further, stating "[t]he bans on outdoor advertising in FAIR,
Giuliani, and [Lindsey] present a good example of the multitude of different regulations tobacco
advertisers face" and "precisely the result Congress was trying to avoid in promulgating §
[51(b)." Id. at 1072-73.
251. Id. at 1074.
252. Id.
253. 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000).
254. For example, promotional giveaways and mail ordering without age verification. Id. at
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(b) Point-of-sale advertising.., any portion of which is placed
lower than five feet from the floor of any retail
establishment accessible to persons younger than 18 years
old, which is located within a 1,000 foot radius of any
public playground, playground area in a public park,
elementary school or secondary school.255
The regulations did provide an exception to the advertising ban
that permitted a "tombstone" sign stating "Tobacco Products Sold
Here." The regulations in Reilly further prescribed mandatory warn-
ing statements to be included on all cigar labeling and advertising.
In Reilly, three separate lawsuits were filed in federal district
court challenging the regulations. These lawsuits were brought by
three different groups: cigarette manufacturers, smokeless tobacco
products manufacturers, and cigar manufacturers. The cigarette and
smokeless tobacco companies claimed that the regulations were pre-
empted by the FCLAA 2 6 and that the regulations violated their free
speech rights under the First Amendment. The cigar companies also
claimed that the regulations violated their First Amendment right to
free speech, and further argued that the cigar warning requirements
imposed by the regulations unduly burdened interstate commerce in
violation of the Commerce Clause. With respect to the preemption
issue, the district court found that only the tombstone provision was
preempted and upheld the remaining parts of the regulations as not
preempted. The district court also rejected the First Amendment
claims, as well as the cigar makers' Commerce Clause challenge.
In a consolidated appeal, the First Circuit concluded that (1) the
regulations were not preempted by the FCLAA, (2) the regulations
did not violate the First Amendment, but (3) the parts of the regula-
tions imposing the cigar warning requirements did violate the Com-
merce Clause and were therefore unconstitutional. The appellate
court affirmed the district court rulings regarding preemption and the
First Amendment but reversed the district court ruling with regard to
the cigar warning requirements. It should be noted, however, that the
district court's ruling that the "tombstone" provision was preempted
by the FCLAA was not appealed and was therefore not before the
appellate court.257
255. Id.
256. The smokeless tobacco companies apparently joined the cigarette makers' challenge
under the FCLAA, which only applies to cigarettes, because of their contention that the regulations
could not be severed to preserve the smokeless tobacco provisions if the cigarette provisions were
declared invalid pursuant to that Act.
257. Seeid. at 37 n.2.
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In its general discussion of preemption, the First Circuit relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in Medtronic, not Cipollone, to deter-
mine when a federal law containing specific preemption language pre-
empts a state regulation. The court found that its task was to identify
"the domain expressly preempted" by § 5(b),
keeping in mind (1) the presumption that Congress does not
intend to supplant state regulation in the area of public health
and the health of minors without a clear and manifest indication
of such preemptory purpose, and (2) that [its] decision must"rest primarily on a 'fair understanding of congressional pur-
pose,"' as informed by the text, the statutory framework and the
purpose of the FCLAA as a whole ..... 2
The appellate court then noted that four other federal courts of
appeal had addressed the preemptive scope of § 5(b), referencing Lind-
sey, Giuliani, FAIR and Penn Advertising.259 The court indicated that
it found the "decisions in Giuliani and FAIR to be particularly help-
ful. ' 26 The First Circuit noted that Giuliani held that "with respect
to advertising and promotion" the language of §5(b) could not be
given a "hyper-literal" reading26 and similarly, FAIR held that this
language could not be viewed with an "uncritical literalism. "262 After
noting the Second Circuit's reliance on the FCLAA's statement of
purpose in Giuliani, the First Circuit found that in that case, the
Second Circuit "logically concluded" that § [5(b)] was intended to pre-
empt "state regulations that would frustrate federal law by creating a'multiplicity of conflicting regulations.' 263  The First Circuit also
noted that the FAIR court declined to imply a preemption finding that
the placement and manner of outdoor advertising was a matter of
traditional local concern. 264  The First Circuit indicated that it was"persuaded by the reasoning" of those two cases that Congress did not
intend § 5(b) to preempt the kind of tobacco advertising restrictions
imposed by the regulations at issue there.265 Specifically, the First
Circuit concluded that it did "not consider such location restrictions to
present the kind of 'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing' advertising
258. Id. at 39 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 40.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 41.
265. Id.
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standards with which Congress was concerned when it enacted the
FCLAA."266
As noted, the First Circuit did not address the issue of whether
the tombstone provision was preempted. The district court in Reilly,
however, relying on the Second Circuit's decision in Vango Media,
found that the provision was preempted. 267  The court stated that
"Vango Media stands for the simple proposition that the Act pre-
empts state legislation that specifically requires or prevents the adver-
tisement of a message concerning the relationship between smoking
and health. 26" The district court had found that the tombstone ad-
vertising provision was preempted because although the provision was
permissive, it prevented tobacco companies "from carrying any mes-
sages whatsoever about the relationship between smoking and health
even those permitted or required under the Act. 269
In addition to its ruling on the preemption issue, the First Cir-
cuit also found that under the standard Central Hudson analysis, the
advertising restrictions imposed by the regulations did not violate of
any of the three groups of tobacco companies' First Amendment
rights.270 The Court did find, however, that both the regulations
providing for warnings requirements for advertising of cigars and the
labeling provisions related to cigars ran afoul of the Commerce Clause
and were invalid. 1
266. Id.
267. For a discussion of Vango Media, see supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
268. Lordillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d 124, 132 (D.Mass. 1999)
269. Id.
270. In Reilly, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to both cigarette manu-
facturers and cigar manufacturers. Consolidated Cigar Corporation v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.
2000) cert. granted, Lordillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 60 U.S.L.W. 3282 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2001) (cigarette
manufacturers); Reilly. Consolidated Cigar Corporation v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2000) cert.
granted, Altadis U.S.A. v. Reilly, 60 U.S.L.W. 3282 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2001) (cigar manufacturers).
Since the cigar makers are involved and the FCLAA does not relate to them, the case has been
viewed as more of an opportunity for the Supreme Court to consider the First Amendment issue-
to determine if the advertising and promotion restrictions at issue in that case should be subject to a
more searching review than the "intermediate" scrutiny traditionally applied in commercial speech
cases. The preemption issue, however, is also before the court.
271. One section of the regulations made it unlawful "for any persons to advertise or cause to
be advertised within [the state] any cigar or little cigar unless the advertising bears one of the warn-
hmg statements.., and the warning statement... comprises 20% of the area of the advertisement
and is in the format required." Reilly, 218 F.3d at 55. The First Circuit found that this provision,
which purportedly applied to advertisements in national magazines sold in the state, as well as to
advertising on the Intemet if viewed from an Internet terminal in the state, created an "excessive"
burden on interstate commerce despite a legitimate public interest. Id. at 56.
Another provision made it unlawful to "manufacture, package, import for sale or distribute
within [the state] any manufactured cigar or manufactured little cigar the package of which does not
bear" the required warning. Id. at 56. The First Circuit found that this provision also burdened
interstate commerce in an impermissible manner because the regulations imposed liability on the
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Some General Observations Relating to Lindsey,
Billboards, and the FCLAA
1. In Lindsey, the Ninth Circuit, Like Other Courts, Misconstrued
the Supreme Court's Discussion of the Preemptive Scope of the
FCLAA in Cipollone by Not Reading It in Context
Lindsey, citing Cipollone, found that the federal preemption issue
was "governed entirely by the express language" of the FCLAA's
preemption statute.272 The Ninth Circuit completely relied on the
Supreme Court's statement in Cipollone to that effect. The Supreme
Court's statement in Cipollone, however, must be read in the specific
context it in which was made-state common law damages actions.
The Ninth Circuit misconstrued Cipollone to the extent that it sug-
gested that the Supreme Court's holding in that regard necessarily
applies to contexts other than the one in Cipollone.
The Supreme Court' statement in Cipollone was made in
response to the court of appeals' conclusion that the amended pre-
emption provision did not expressly preempt the common law claims
at issue, but rather impliedly preempted certain other claims. It was
within this context that the Supreme Court's statement was made. 273
manufacturers for every import, sale or distribution of an improperly labeled package in the state,
even if a third party made the sale or the distribution was unconnected with the manufacturer. Id.
Therefore, manufacturers could not safely label only those packages intended for the state; they had
to include this warning on all packages just in case one somehow later appeared in the state. Id.
272. 195 F.3d at 1069.
273. This is illustrated by the Supreme Court's discussion, which went as follows:
The Court of Appeals was not persuaded that the pre-emption provision in the 1969
Act encompassed state common-law claims. It was also not persuaded that the label-
ing obligation imposed by both the 1965 and 1969 Acts revealed a congressional
intent to exert exclusive federal control over every aspect of the relationship between
cigarettes and health. Nevertheless, reading the statute as a whole in the light of the
statement of purpose in § 2, and considering the potential regulatory effect of state
common-law actions on the federal interest in uniformity, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that Congress had impliedly pre-empted petitioners' claims challenging the
adequacy of the warnings on labels or in advertising or the propriety of respondents'
advertising and promotional activities.
In our opinion, the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act is gov-
erned entirely by the express language in § 5 of each Act. When Congress has
considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a
provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a 'reliable
indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,' 'there is no need to
infer congressional intent to preempt state laws from the substantive provisions' of the
legislation. Such reasoning is a variant of the familiar principle of expression unius est
exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of
Federal Preemption and the FCLAA
Cipollone's discussion of the preemptive scope of the FCLAA
was in the context of state common law damage claims based on the
use of tobacco. The context of Lindsey, however, was a local restric-
tion on tobacco advertising. The question is, then, whether the
Supreme Court's holding with regard to the FCLAA's preemptive
scope mandates that it is never appropriate to look beyond the
preemption statute. That answer is easy. The Supreme Court in
Cipollone simply stated "[i]n this case the other provisions of the
[FCLAA] offer no cause to look beyond [the preemption statute] § 5."
The Supreme Court clearly did not suggest that this would always be
the case. The Ninth Circuit misconstrued the Supreme Court's state-
ment by failing to consider its context.
In addition to Lindsey, other courts failed to consider Cipollone's
statement regarding the scope of the FCLAA's preemption provision
in its proper context. The Second Circuit appears to have made this
error in Vango Media,274 the Fourth Circuit in Penn Advertising,"' the
First Circuit in Harshbarger,2 76 and the district court in Reilly.177 The
Seventh Circuit in FAIR, however, noted that after Cipollone, the
Supreme Court later in Medtronic27' "took pains to clarify what it
meant in Cipollone" while considering a preemption provision in a dif-
ferent statute. In Medtronic, the Supreme Court explained as follows:
As in Cipollone, we are presented with the task of interpreting a
statutory provision that expressly pre-empts state law. While
the pre-emptive language of [the statute at issue in Medtronic]
means that we need not go beyond that language to determine
whether Congress intended the [statute] to pre-empt at least
some state law, we must nonetheless 'identify the domain ex-
pressly pre-empted' by that language. Although our analysis of
the scope of the pre-emption statute must begin with its text,
a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted. In this case, the
other provisions of the 1965 and 1969 Acts offer no cause to look beyond § 5 of each
Act. Therefore, we need only identify the domain expressly pre-empted by each of
those sections.
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-17.
274. Vango Media, 34 F.3d at 72 ("Most important, seven members of the [Supreme]
Court in [Cipollone] concluded that 'the pre-emptive scope of the... Act is governed entirely by
the express language in § [5(b)]."').
275. Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1322.
276. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d at 78 (finding that it was bound by the majority's holding in
Cipollone that § 5(b) governed the preemptive scope of the FCLAA).
277. Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 130 ("According to the Supreme Court, the pre-emptive
scope of the Act 'is governed entirely by the express language in § 5 [and] there is no need to
infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legisla-
tion."').
278. 518 U.S. 470 (1996)
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our interpretation of that language does not occur in a contextual
vacuum.
279
Since Cipollone, the Supreme Court has specifically suggested looking
beyond the "express language" of a preemption statute.
As set forth above, the statement that the preemptive scope of
the FCLAA is "governed entirely by the express language" was made
in the specific context of state common law damages claims. Since
Cipollone, the Court has backtracked from this assertion. Lindsey and
other cases dealing with local advertising restrictions clearly address
the preemption or nonpreemption issue in a different context, and
Cipollone's holding, in that regard, does not necessarily apply to them.
2. Both the Original FCLAA and 1969 Act Targeted the
Television, Radio, and Print Media but Did Not Refer to Billboard
Advertising Either in the Acts Themselves or in the Legislative
Histories Accompanying Them
As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit suggested in Lindsey that the
various local restrictions on tobacco advertising at issue were "pre-
cisely the result Congress was trying to avoid in promulgating §
[5](b). '' 280  Is it true that the FCLAA was really promulgated to
prevent these types of regulations? The Ninth Circuit should look
closer at the legislative history of the FCLAA.
The legislative history of the FCLAA demonstrates that when
the Act was initially enacted, it focused primarily on television, radio,
and print advertising, and not on billboard advertising. The House
Report accompanying the 1965 Act explained the issue as follows:
Some proposals have been made in this area, which might lead to
severe curtailing or the possible elimination of cigarette advertis-
ing. This could have a serious economic impact on the televi-
sion, radio, and publishing industries in the United States.
After giving consideration to various alternative approaches to
the problem, the committee determined that congressional ac-
tion should be taken in order to dispose of this problem
promptly and effectively. 281
Neither the original Act nor the accompanying legislative history
made any reference to billboards.8 2 In the original Act, cigarette
advertising did not require health warnings. Rather, compulsory
279. FAIR, 189 F.3d at 637 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484-85).
280. Lindsey, 195 F.3d at 1074.
281. H.R. REP. No. 449 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350, 2352.
282. See id.; FCLAA, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
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warnings on the package were required, and the cigarette manufac-
turing industry had announced the cigarette advertising code. That
code prescribed voluntary standards to eliminate certain advertising
and promotional practices.2 3 Additionally, this code aimed to elim-
inate practices such as "(1) [representations] tending to make cigarette
smoking attractive to minors; (2) health representations; [and] (3)
representations as to the quantity of an ingredient to be found in the
smoke of a cigarette, unless such representations are significant in
terms of health and based on adequate, relevant, and valid scientific
data, or the representations are accompanied by a satisfactory dis-
claimer as to the significance thereof in terms of health. '214 Under the
code, all cigarette advertising was required to be submitted in advance
to an administrator of the code who had the power to prohibit any
advertising that did not meet the requirements of the code.2 ' The
administrator of the code testified before a House Committee that
he interpret[ed] his powers under the code very broadly, and
that he interpret[ed] the term 'advertising' to include not only
material broadcast on radio and television and printed in maga-
zines but also to include the labeling on packages, counter
displays, and all other materials which can be interpreted as pro-
moting the sale of cigarettes. 6
This purported effort of the cigarette industry's self-regulation also
does not appear to have included billboards advertising.8 7
Even when the FCLAA was amended in 1969 by the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,288 the legislative history
accompanying it was telling. The Senate Report clearly explained that"the purpose of [the amendment was] to provide adequate warning to
the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking through strengthening
cautionary labeling of all cigarette packages and to prohibit, after Jan-
uary 1, 1971, all television and radio broadcasting of cigarette adver-
tisements." 2 9 Senate Report 566, however, also emphasized that there
was a "strong desire that the cigarette industry not only honor its
statement to carefully limit print advertising so as not to appeal to
youth, but that it will also exercise restraint in the overall use of print
283. H.R. REP. NO. 449 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350, 233.
284. Id. at 2362.
285. Id.
286. Id. Unfortunately, the text of the FCLAA does not specifically describe the types of
advertisements to which it is meant to apply.
287. Unless one considers billboards to constitute "materials."
288. The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994)).
289. S. REP. NO. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652.
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advertising and other forms of promotion. ' 29 ° The legislative history
accompanying the 1969 Act also clearly reflects the fact that the
FCLAA was primarily aimed at television, radio, and print advertis-
ing.291 That legislative history did recognize "that the cigarette indus-
try might shift its enormous advertising expenditures on television and
radio to advertising in other media. '29 2 There is, however, no sugges-
tion that the FCLAA was meant to apply to such advertising in "other
media" or to billboard advertising specifically.
3. The FCLAA Did Not Specifically Reference Billboards Until
1984, Well After Even the Amended Preemption Provision Was in
Place, and It Distinguishes Them from Other Types of Advertising
The original FCLAA did not reference billboards; neither did
the Act after its amendment in 1969.293 In 1984, the scope of places
that required warnings under the FCLAA was expanded to include
both advertising and billboards. This expansion occurred well after
the amended preemption provision, which had been place since 1969.
As noted, the legislative history of the original FCLAA reflects
the fact that it was aimed at television, radio, and print media, with no
reference to billboards. The amendment in 1969 later prohibited all
television and radio broadcasting of cigarette advertisements, but
specifically prohibited Federal Trade Commission action on print
advertising until on or after July 1, 1971.294 It is important to under-
stand that both of the FCLAA's preemption provisions were adopted
within this setting.
The FCLAA did not reference billboards until 1984, when the
warning requirement was placed on cigarette advertising. A question
is, then, whether the Act's preemption provisions, in place for more
than a decade, were meant to apply to this type of advertising. When
Congress enacted the FCLAA, it was concerned about the different
states regulating the advertising and labeling of cigarettes.295 With
respect to advertising, however, the question is whether Congress was
concerned about state regulations dealing with billboards or whether it
was concerned only with the television, radio, and print media. Again,
290. Id. at 2662.
291. As with the original Act, the 1969 Act also made no reference to billboards.
292. Id. at 2661.
293. As noted in previous section, neither did the legislative histories of the original Act or
the 1969 Act.
294. The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1994)). As noted, the legislative history indicates that
Congress was asking for some voluntary restraint on the part of cigarette manufacturers and
advertisers, with regard to print advertising. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
295. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 513-14.
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the legislative histories accompanying the preemption provisions
suggest that Congress was only concerned with the latter.296
In addition to the legislative history, the structure of the FCLAA
after the 1984 amendment is also revealing. Section 4(a) of the Act,
dealing with the required warnings, describes three different categories
with respect to such warnings: packages, advertisements, and bill-
boards.297  The FCLAA by its terms, therefore, distinguishes bill-
boards from advertising. This supports the proposition that prior to
the 1984 amendment, the FCLAA did not apply to billboards. If it
had, there would be no reason for this distinction.
296. In Cipollone, the Supreme Court noted that the California State Senate had passed a
total ban on both print and electronic cigarette advertisements. See id. at 515 n. 11.
297. Specifically, § 34(a) reads as follows:
(a) Required warnings; packages; advertisements; billboards
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, package, or import for sale or
distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which fails to bear,
in accordance with the requirements of this section, one of the following labels:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any manufacturer or importer of cigarettes to advertise or
cause to be advertised (other than through the use of outdoor billboards) within the United
States any cigarette unless the advertising bears, in accordance with the requirements
of this section, one of the following labels:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
(3) It shall be unlawful for any manufacturer or importer of cigarettes to advertise or
cause to be advertised within the United States through the use of outdoor billboards any
cigarette unless the advertising bears, in accordance with the requirements of this sec-
tion, one of the following labels:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly
Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1994) (parentheses original) (emphasis added).
Seattle University Law Review
As set forth above, the issue is whether the FCLAA's preemp-
tion provisions were meant to apply to billboards. The history of the
Act does not show that they were. Further, the structure of the Act
demonstrates that billboards are distinguished from other advertising.
B. The Problem with the Ninth Circuit's Extensive
Reliance on Cipollone
1. Cipollone Addressed the Preemption or Nonpreemption of State
Based-Activities in a Very Different Context from That in Lindsey
and the Other Cases and, Further, Was Only a Plurality Decision
As the district court in FAIR recognized, "Cipollone address[ed]
the preemption or nonpreemption of state-based activities in a very
different context" than that which was at issue in FAIR.298 The dis-
trict court was right, as FAIR and Cipollone involved two entirely
different contexts---one involved a state tort damages action and the
other local regulations restricting cigarette advertising. FAIR, Lindsey,
Penn Advertising, Giuliani, and Reilly present a different question
regarding the applicability of the FCLAA's amended preemption
provision than does Cipollone. Although the district court in FAIR
appreciated this important distinction, 299 there is no indication that
this was true with regard to the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey.
Further, Cipollone was only a plurality opinion, although there
were parts of the opinion in which a majority of the Supreme Court
joined. Parts of the opinion that were only supported by the plurality
include references to the amended preemption provision and the
methodology prescribed to evaluate whether a particular claim was
preempted."0 Lindsey and the other courts, therefore, were not bound
by the methodology used to examine the amended preemption provi-
sion in Cipollone. In fact, since five of the Justices, a majority of the
Court, were highly critical of the plurality's methodology,0 1 it is
298. FAIR v. City of Chicago, 12 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1998) aff'd in part, revd
in part, 189 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
299. While the district court in FAIR accepted Cipollone's teaching in regard to the
FCLAA's preemptive scope, the court did not find the opinion too helpful otherwise. See id.
("Cipollone really does not mark out a path for resolution of the issue posed in this case.").
300. The district court in FAIR apparently would not consider or even discuss the parts of
the Cipollone opinion that were only supported by the plurality, even though it specifically
acknowledged that those parts of the opinion "might have the greatest promise for casting light"
on the question in its case. Id.
301. The three-Justice partial concurrence in the judgment and partial dissent authored by
Justice Blackmun and the two-Justice partial concurrence in the judgment and partial dissent
authored by Justice Scalia.
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unclear whether this methodology should be regarded as the Court's
view on this matter.
2. The Supreme Court's Plurality Opinion in Cipollone Was a
Compromise Decision About the Extent to Which Federal Law
Preempts State Law Tort Damages Claims Against Cigarette
Manufacturers
In Lindsey, the Ninth Circuit, relied extensively on Cipollone; so
too did the appellate courts in Penn Advertising, FAIR, and Giuliani,
and the district court in Reilly.a°2 However, as noted, Cipollone
involved a very different context and was only a plurality opinion.
Further, as amply expressed by Justice Blackman, the plurality's deci-
sion in Cipollone represented "a compromise position concerning the
extent to which federal law preempts persons injured by cigarette
manufacturers' unlawful conduct from bringing state common law
damages claims against those manufacturers."303
With respect to the amended preemption provision, three of the
Justices in Cipollone would have found no express preemption.3 4 Two
of the Justices, on the other hand, would have found that it preempted
all of the state common law claims.3"' A four-member plurality ulti-
mately prevailed, ruling that certain of the state common law claims
were apparently "expressly" preempted, while others were not.30 6
The plurality came to its conclusion despite the fact that it joined
the majority of the Court in recognizing that '[t]he purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone' of preemption analysis. '37  The
plurality, also part of the majority, determined that the issue was"governed entirely by the express language" of the amended preemp-
tion provision. As noted, the amended preemption provision read as
follows: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in con-
formity with the provisions of this Act. 30 8  The first question is
whether this language expressly preempts state common law damages
302. Remarkably, there is little reference to Cipollone in the opinion of the appellate court
in Reilly.
303. 505 U.S. at 531 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
304. Id. at 507, 531-44 (Blackmun, Kennedy & Souter, J.J.).
305. Id. at 544-55 (Scalia & Thomas, J.J.).
306. Id. at 508-31 (Stevens, White, & O'Connor, J.J. and Rehnquist, C.J.).
307. 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
308. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
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actions. If so, a second question is whether it expressly preempts
certain state common law damages actions but not others.
Assuming that the explicit language of this provision controls, it
seems that one of the two positions by Justice Scalia or Justice Black-
mun could be taken-either that all of the state common law damages
claims were preempted or that none of them were preempted. Instead,
a plurality of the Court chose a middle ground, holding that some of
the claims were preempted and some were not. The plurality's
reasoning, in essence, amounts to a determination that Congress"explicitly" intended to preempt certain state common law claims but
not others. How does one determine which state common law claims
Congress intended to preempt and which ones it did not intend to
preempt? Congress apparently determined that those state common
law claims where the predicate legal duty constitutes a "requirement
or prohibition based on smoking and health.., imposed under State
law with respect to ... advertising or promotion" should be pre-
empted. °9
The Supreme Court could clearly have taken either the position
that all or none of the state common law damages claims were pre-
empted. Instead, the Court chose a compromise that some claims
were preempted and some were not. Since Lindsey, Penn Advertising,
FAIR, Giuliani, and Reilly do not involve state common law damages
actions, the application of the compromise decision in Cipollone to
these cases is, therefore, unclear.
3. Despite the Edict in Cipollone to Rely "Entirely" Upon the
Express Language of § 5(b), the Plurality Still Proceeded
to Examine the Act's History, Structure, and Purpose to
Delineate Its Preemptive Impact
As noted, the Supreme Court in Cipollone indicated that the
preemption issue in that case was "governed entirely" by the express
language of the FCLAA's preemption provisions. As recognized by
the appellate court in FAIR and the district court in Reilly, one should
not literally rely on this purported mandate.
Cipollone has been read to suggest that the scope of the
FCLAA's preemption is determined solely by the preemption statute
itself and not by the substantive provisions of the legislation or any-
thing else. A complete reliance on such a suggestion, however, is
misplaced.
309. Id. This is the methodology described by the plurality to determine whether such
claims are preempted. See Cipollone, 505 at 524 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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First, actions speak louder than words. As the Seventh Circuit in
FAIR explained:
In Cipollone, the [Supreme] Court stated that "the pre-emptive
scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act is governed entirely by
the express language in § 5 of each Act." Notably, however,
every opinion in Cipollone nevertheless relied on legislative his-
tory, historical context, legislative purpose, or analysis of the
statutory provisions as a whole in interpreting the scope of the
preemption provision mandated by the language of § 5(b) of the
1969 Act.3 10
Similarly, the district court in Reilly noted that "despite the Supreme
Court's mandate to rely 'entirely' upon the express language of section
5(b), Cipollone proceeded to examine the Act's 'structure and purpose'
to delineate its pre-emptive impact, emphasizing that the 'purpose' of
the Act is 'the ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis.""'31 Fol-
lowing the lead of the Supreme Court in Cipollone, the appellate courts
in FAIR and Reilly looked beyond the language of section 5(b) and
examined other sources to discern the purpose of the FCLAA's
preemption provision.' The appellate courts in Giuliani and Harsh-
barger also looked beyond the language of the preemption provision. 313
Even the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey purportedly did this.314
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court has somewhat
retreated from its purported edict in Cipollone, relying entirely upon
the express language of the preemption provision in Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr.315 Medtronic explained that the text of the preemption statute
was only the starting point to determine the preemptive scope of a
statute. 31 6 Medtronic reemphasized that in determining whether Con-
gress has preempted such activity, the purpose of Congress must, in
310. FAIR, 189 F.3d at 637 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 513-15, 517, 519-20, 529).
311. Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 130 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516).
312. FAIR, 189 F.3d at 637 ("[W]e must examine the congressional scheme and legislative
history of § 5[b] in order to determine what Congress meant .. "); Reilly, 218 F.3d at 38
("[Rielevant to consider the 'structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,' as revealed not only
in text, but through the reviewing courts' reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress
intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and
the law.").
313. Giuliani, 195 F.3d at 106 ("Congress has provided valuable insight into the intended
scope of preemption .... ); Harshbarger, 122 F.3d at 77 ("[Wle find the explicit preemption lan-
guage and legislative history [of the FCLAA] insufficient to clear[ly] and manifest[ly] overcome
the presumption against preemption of a state's traditional powers to legislate for the health and
safety of its citizens.").
314. Lindsey, 195 F.3d at 1073 ("The structure and history of § 1334(b) support our view
that a local ban on outdoor advertising is preempted by the FCLAA.").
315. FAIR, 189 F.3d at 637 (referencing Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470).
316. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517).
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every case, be "the ultimate touchstone." '317 That intent, the Court
explained, is discerned not only from the language of the Act, but also
from the statutory framework and the structure and purpose of the
Act as a whole.31
The suggestion that preemption analysis must be limited solely
to the language of § 5(b) is therefore incorrect. The Supreme Court
did not do this in Cipollone and has since "clarified" that such a sug-
gestion was not exactly what it intended.
C. There Are Legitimate Criticisms Regarding the
Plurality's Opinion in Cipollone
1. The Plurality's Determination That the Amended
Preemption Provision Expressly Preempts Certain
State Law Claims but Not Others Is Questionable
and Operates Much Like Implied Preemption
The plurality opinion in Cipollone, as noted, concluded that cer-
tain state common law damages claims were preempted by the
FCLAA's amended preemption provision while others were not. This
was purportedly based on the application of express preemption. The
plurality further suggested that resorting to principles of implied
preemption in that case was improper. Assuming arguendo that the
explicit language of the amended preemption provision was control-
ling and that there could be no resort to implied preemption (as set
forth below), its conclusion is suspect for a number of reasons.
a. Is There a "Reliable Indicium of Congressional Intent?"
As noted, a majority of the Supreme Court in Cipollone held that
the preemptive scope of the FCLAA was "governed entirely" by its
preemption provisions. The Court explained that
[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and
has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly
addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a 'relia-
ble indicium of congressional intent with respect to state author-
ity,' 'there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt
state laws from the substantive provision' of the legislation.31 9
317. Id. at 485 (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963)).
318. Seeid. at 486.
319. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
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The question then is whether these preemption provisions provide a"reliable indicium of congressional intent" with respect to state com-
mon law damages claims.
With respect to the original preemption provision, seven of the
nine Justices agreed that it did not preempt any of the state common
law damages claims. However, as noted, in reference to the amended
preemption provision, the Court was split among three different posi-
tions. Three of the Justices stated there was no express preemption.32 °
Two of the Justices would have held that the Act preempted all of the
state common law claims."' Four of the Justices, who would comprise
the plurality, determined that certain of the state common law claims
were "expressly" preempted, while others were not.322 A majority
therefore found that there was at least some express preemption of
state common law damages claims by the amended preemption provi-
323sion.
Again, the amended preemption provision reads as follows: "No
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this Act. 324 The first question is, does this language"clearly" or "manifestly" exhibit an intent to preempt state common
law damages actions, or are these words in reality far from unambigu-
ous such that they cannot be said clearly to evidence such a congres-
sional mandate? A second question is, if Congress had intended to
immunize cigarette manufacturers from these state law tort damages
actions, did it know how to do so in clear and unambiguous terms?
The answer to the first question appears to be no. 32 ' The answer to
the second question is obviously yes.
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Cipollone, the amended
preemption provision does not provide a "reliable indicium of con-
gressional intent" with respect to state common law damages claims.
Compounding the problem is the plurality's determination that this
320. Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter.
321. Justices Scalia and Thomas.
322. Justices Stevens, White, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
323. Id. This occurs when you add Justices Scalia and Thomas, who would have found
that all of the state common law claims were preempted, with the four member plurality of Jus-
tices Stevens, White, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who ultimately determined that
certain of these claims were preempted.
324. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
325. As noted previously, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that "the phrase 'require-
ment or prohibition ... imposed under State law' was too obscure.., to say that it [was] an
express declaration that state common law tort actions are preempted." Forster, 437 N.W.2d at
658.
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provision expressly preempts certain claims but not others.326 As set
forth below, none of the other courts that have considered this issue
have found any express preemption of state common law damages
claims by this provision.
b. The Other Courts Found No Express Preemption
In Cipollone, the Third Circuit found that the FCLAA's
amended preemption provision did not provide for express preemp-
tion of state common law claims. In addition, the Eleventh, First,
Sixth, and Fifth Circuits (in Stephen, Palmer, Roysdon, and Pennington,
respectively) all found that there was no express preemption of such
claims by this provision. Further, both the Minnesota Supreme Court
and the New Jersey Supreme Court (in Forster and Dewey, respec-
tively) came to the same conclusion. Cipollone, therefore, reached its
conclusion that there was some express preemption despite the fact
that five federal circuit courts and the highest courts in two states
found otherwise.
c. The Methodology Created Operates Much Like Implied Preemption
The plurality in Cipollone described a methodology to determine
whether a particular claim is preempted or not: "The central inquiry
in each case is ... whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the
common-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health.., imposed under State law with respect
to... advertising or promotion' and, if so, if it should be pre-
empted.327 The plurality's methodology, which requires that each of
the common-law claims be examined to determine whether it is in fact
preempted, operates more like some type of implied preemption than
any application of express preemption.
2. Although Justices Blackmun and Scalia Reached Opposite
Conclusions in Cipollone, Each Makes a Good
Argument Criticizing the Plurality Opinion and
Both Agree It Created a Confusing Methodology
Although Justice Scalia and Justice Blackmun were on opposite
ends of the spectrum in Cipollone, both were highly critical of the
plurality opinion. Justice Scalia made the argument that the plurality
326. As noted earlier, one would have expected a ruling that would have taken one of the
positions of either Justice Scalia or Justice Blackmun-that all of the state common law claims
were expressly preempted or that none of them were expressly preempted.
327. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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created a new rule on implied preemption. Justice Blackmun chal-
lenged the plurality's reasoning that the amended preemption provi-
sion preempts some common law damages claims, contending that the
plurality disregarded the legislative history accompanying the pro-
vision. Both Justice Blackmun and Justice Scalia agreed that the
plurality created a confusing methodology for evaluating whether a
claim was preempted.
a. Scalia: Plurality Created New Rule on Implied Preemption
Although the plurality in Cipollone did not come out and say so
directly, it certainly seemed to suggest that since there was an express
preemption provision involved in that case, it was wrong for the Third
Circuit to resort to the principles of implied preemption. In his sep-
arate opinion, Justice Blackmun, who was joined by two other Justices,
was more direct, specifically stating that resorting to principles of im-
plied preemption is appropriate "only when Congress has been silent
with respect to preemption."328
As noted, five federal appellate courts and the highest court in
two states found that the FCLAA's amended preemption provision
did not expressly preempt state law tort damages claims.329 Appar-
ently, none of these seven courts knew that it was improper to resort to
principles of implied preemption when they considered the possible
application of those principles to the cases before them.
The Third Circuit in Cipollone agreed with the district court's
conclusion that the FCLAA's amended preemption provision did not
provide for express preemption of state common law claims; the court
found that it "was constrained by the presumption against preemp-
tion."33' The appellate court found "support for this determination in
Congress's failure to include state common law explicitly within
section [5], as it did in numerous other statutes." '' It noted "that just
as Congress could have included a reference to preemption of state
common law in section [5], it also could have included a 'savings
clause' explicitly preserving the continued vitality of state common
328. Id. at 532 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
329. Again, these were the Third, Eleventh, First, Sixth and Fifth Circuits in Cipollone,
Stephen, Palmer, Roysdon and Pennington, respectively and the Minnesota Supreme Court and
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Forster and Dewey, respectively.
330. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 185.
331. Id. The Third Circuit cited to the following statutes: Domestic Housing and Inter-
national Recovery and Financial Stability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-17(d) (1994); Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994); and Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a), (c)(1) (1994). Id. at 185-86, n.5.
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law. "3312 The Third Circuit however, found that § 5's lack of any refer-
ence to preemption of state common law was significant because of the
presumption against preemption.33 The court further noted that "in
the absence of a preemption provision encompassing state common
law, the Supreme Court has relied generally on principles of implied
preemption in evaluating whether a statutory scheme preempts state
common law. ' 334 Accordingly, the court found that it had to examine
the issue under the principles of implied preemption. 3 1
On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the pre-
emption issue was "entirely governed" by the express language of the
preemption provisions.336 It stated that
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly address-
ing that issue, and when that provision provides a "reliable
indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,"
"there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state
laws from the substantive provisions" of the legislation.337
The Court also stated that "Congress' enactment of a provision
defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters
beyond that reach are not pre-empted. ''33' The Supreme Court found
that there was "no cause to look beyond" the FCLAA's two preemp-
tion provisions to "identify the domain expressly pre-empted by" each
one. 3
39
Ironically, Justice Scalia, who would have found that all of the
state common law claims were preempted by the amended preemption
provision, made a good defense for a court's resort to implied preemp-
tion despite the existence of an express preemption provision. Justice
Scalia found that Cipollone created this new rule and was highly
critical of it.3 0
332. Id. at 186, n.5. The court cited to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1994). Id. As noted previously, another example of a statute with a "savings
clause" is the Smokeless Tobacco Act.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 185-86.
335. Id. at 186.
336. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Justice Scalia explained as follows:
[T]he... new rule that the Court announces: 'When Congress has considered the
issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly
addressing that issue.... we need only identify the domain expressly pre-empted by
(that provision].' Once there is an express pre-emption provision, in other words, all
doctrines of implied preemption are eliminated. This proposition may be correct
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b. Blackmun: Plurality's Reasoning Flawed and
Disregarded Legislative History
Justice Blackmun disputed the plurality's conclusion that certain
state common law damages actions were preempted by the 1969 Act.
First, Justice Blackmun insisted that the plain language of the
amended provision clearly fails to require preemption of state common
law claims. In addition, he maintained that "there is no suggestion in
the legislative history [accompanying the 1969 Act] that Congress
intended to expand the scope of the pre-emption provision in the
drastic manner that the plurality attributes to it.,,341
i. The Plain Language of the 1969 Act
Justice Blackmun found that "[g]iven the Court's proper analyti-
cal focus on the scope of the express pre-emption provisions at issue
[t]here and its acknowledgment that the 1965 Act [did] not pre-empt
state common-law damages claims, [that] the plurality's conclusion
that the 1969 Act pre-empts at least some common law damages
claims is [a] little short of baffling. ' 342 Justice Blackmun's argument
in that regard is clear. His position was that the language in the
amended preemption provision "no more 'clearly' or 'manifestly' ex-
hibits an intent to pre-empt state common-law damages actions than
did the language of its predecessor in the 1965 Act. 3 43
Justice Blackmum did not disagree with the plurality that the
phrase "State law," in an appropriate case, could encompass common
law as well as positive enactments like statutes and regulations.3 44 He
insofar as implied "field" preemption is concerned: The existence of an express pre-
emption provision tends to contradict any inference that Congress intended to occupy
a field broader than the statute's express language defines. However, with regard to
implied 'conflict' pre-emption-i.e., where state regulation actually conflicts with fed-
eral law or where state regulation 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution' of Congress's purposes-the Court's... new rule works mischief. If taken
seriously, it would mean, for example, that if a federal consumer protection law pro-
vided that no state agency or court shall assert jurisdiction under state law over any
workplace safety issue with respect to which a federal standard is in effect, then a state
agency operating under a law dealing with a subject other than workplace safety (e.g.,
consumer protection) could impose requirements entirely contrary to federal law-
forbidding, for example, the use of certain safety equipment that federal law requires.
To my knowledge, we have never expressed such a rule before, and our prior cases are
inconsistent with it.
Id. at 547-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
341. Id. at 539 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
342. Id. at 534.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 535.
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did not, however, believe that such a phrase as used in the amended
preemption provision "represent[ed] such an all-inclusive refer-
ence."34 Justice Blackmun insisted that the phrase "State law" as used
in this provision could not "be understood without considering the
narrow range of actions-any 'requirement or prohibition'-that Con-
gress specifically described in § 5(b) as 'imposed under' state law. 346
Justice Blackmun concluded that "[a]lthough the plurality flatly states
that the phrase 'no requirement or prohibition' 'sweeps broadly' and'easily encompass[es] obligations that take the form of common law
rules,' those words are in reality far from unambiguous and [cannot]
be said clearly to evidence a congressional mandate to preempt state
common-law damages actions." '347 Justice Blackmun's position, as he
demonstrated, was supported by the common meanings of the terms"requirement" and "prohibition." '348 The term "require," Justice
Blackman noted, means "to ask for authoritatively or imperatively;
claim by right and authority" or "to demand as necessary or essential
(as on general principles or in order to comply with or satisfy some
regulation)"; "prohibition" is an "[a]ct or law prohibiting something"
or an "interdiction. 349
Justice Blackmun further noted that there was a "recognized dis-
tinction" in the "[Supreme] Court's jurisprudence between direct state
regulation and the indirect regulatory effects of common law dam-
ages."'3 To justify its decision, the plurality relied on the Court's
statement in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon35' that "reg-
ulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as
through some form of preventive relief."3 2 Justice Blackmun noted
that the Supreme Court in two other cases recognized and "explained
that Garmon, in which a state common-law damages award was found
to be pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act, involved a
special 'presumption of federal pre-emption."'"3  Further, post-
Garmon, as Justice Blackmun noted, the Court in Goodyear Atomic
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See id. at 535-36.
349. Id. at 536 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1929
(1981) for the definition of the term "require" and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1212 (6th ed.
1990) for the definition of the term "prohibition").
350. Id. at 538.
351. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
352. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 537 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
353. See id. at 537 n.3 and accompanying text (citing Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S.
491, 502 (1984) and English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990)).
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Corp. v. Miller3 .4 and English v. General Electric Co.,"' distinguished,
for purposes of preemption analysis, "direct state regulation" from the"incidental regulatory effects" of a state damages action, declining in
those cases to find certain state damages claims preempted." 6 Justice
Blackmun complained that despite the plurality's acknowledgement
that there was
"no general, inherent conflict between federal pre-emption of
state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state
common-law damages actions," the plurality apparently [found]
Garmon's statement that "regulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of preven-
tive relief," sufficient authority to warrant extinguishing the
common-law actions at issue in [Cipollone]."'
However, Justice Blackmun concluded:
In light of the recognized distinction in [the Supreme] Court's
jurisprudence between direct state regulation and the indirect
regulatory effects of common-law damages actions, it cannot be
said that damages claims are clearly or unambiguously 'require-
ments' or 'prohibitions' imposed under state law. The plain lan-
guage of the 1969 Act's modified preemption provision simply
cannot bear the broad interpretation the plurality would impart
to it.3
58
ii. The Legislative History Accompanying the 1969 Act
Justice Blackmun also stated that "there [was] no suggestion in
the legislative history that Congress intended to expand the scope of
the pre-emption provision when it amended the statute in 1969." ' In
fact, the plurality had to acknowledge that neither party in Cipollone
even contended that the amended provision materially altered the pre-
emptive scope of the FCLAA 6° The plurality, however, determined
that the amended preemption provision was much broader than the
354. 486 U.S. 174 (1988).
355. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
356. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). As Justice Blackmun indicated, Goodyear contrasted
"direct state regulation" of safety matters with "the incidental regulatory effects" of damages
awarded pursuant to a state workers' compensation law, while English dealt with whether state
common law damages claims for emotional distress were preempted by federal nuclear energy
law. Id.
357. Id. at 537 (citing plurality opinion of Stevens, J. at 521).
358. Id. at 538-39.
359. Id. at 539.
360. See id. at 520 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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original provision, despite the legislative history and the fact that
neither party made such a contention. 361
The legislative history accompanying the amended preemption
provision indicates that the 1969 amendment merely "clarified" the
1965 version of § 5(b).362 As Justice Blackmun stated, the plurality
simply dismissed this evidence of legislative intent as the "views of a
subsequent Congress. 363 However, as Justice Blackmun explained:
The plurality [was] wrong not only as a factual matter-for the
statements of the Congress that amended § 5(b) are contempo-
raneous, not 'subsequent,' to enactment of the revised pre-
emption provision-but as a legal matter as well. [The
Supreme] Court affords 'great weight' to an amending Congress'
interpretation of the underlying statute.364
Justice Blackmun made two other observations relating to the
plurality and its treatment of the legislative history. First, he observed
that "the plurality admit[ted] that 'portions of the legislative history of
the 1969 Act suggest that Congress was primarily concerned with pos-
itive enactments by States and localities.'"36 He noted that the legis-
lative history explains that the revised preemption provision was"intended to include not only action by State statute but by all other
administrative actions or local ordinances or regulations by any polit-
ical subdivisions of any State. 366 Justice Blackmun found this "list
remarkable for the absence of any reference to common-law damages
actions."367
Second, Justice Blackmun observed that the plurality acknowl-
edged that Congress made no effort to alter the statement of purpose
contained in § 2 of the 1965 Act.368 Section 2 provides in pertinent
part that "commerce and the national economy ... not [be] impeded
by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertis-
ing regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and
health." '369 Justice Blackmun found "the continued vitality of § 2
significant, particularly in light of the Court's reliance on the same
361. Id. at 529-31.
362. S. REP. No. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663.
363. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 539 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part)(quoting plurality opinion of Stevens, J. at 520).
364. Id. (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 and n.8 (1969)).
365. Id. at 540 (quoting plurality opinion of Stevens, J. at 521).
366. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. FCLAA, Pub. L. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (emphasis added).
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statement of purpose for its earlier conclusion that the 1965 Act [did]
not pre-empt state common law damages actions. '
c. Blackmun and Scalia: The Plurality
Created a Confusing Methodology
In a footnote, the plurality in Cipollone acknowledged criticism
by both Justice Blackmun and Justice Scalia regarding the method-
ology it created for evaluating whether a claim is preempted." 1 Both
Justices challenged the level of generality employed in the plurality's
analysis. As the plurality explained:
Justice Blackmun contends that, as a matter of consistency, we
should construe failure-to-warn claims not as based on smoking
and health, but rather as based on the broader duty "to inform
consumers of known risks." Justice Scalia contends that, again
as a matter of consistency, we should construe fraudulent-misre-
presentation claims not as based on a general duty not to deceive
but rather as 'based on smoking and health.'3
The plurality's response was that:
[a]dmittedly, each of these positions has some conceptual attrac-
tion. However, our ambition here is not theoretical elegance,
but rather a fair understanding of congressional purpose.
To analyze failure-to-warn claims at the highest level of gen-
erality (as Justice Blackmun would have us do) would render the
1969 amendments almost meaningless and would pay too little
respect to Congress' substantial reworking of the Act. On the
other hand, to analyze fraud claims at the lowest level of gen-
erality (as Justice Scalia would have us do) would conflict both
with the background presumption against pre-emption and with
legislative history that plainly expresses an intent to preserve the
"police regulations" of the States.373
Justice Blackman responded, stating that "[t]he plurality pre-
mise[d] its pre-emption ruling on what it terms the 'substantial
changes' wrought by Congress in § 5(b), notably, the rewording of the
provision to pre-empt any 'requirement or prohibition' (as opposed
370. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 541 (emphasis original) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing the plurality opinion of Stevens, J.
at 519).
371. Id. at 529-30 n.27 (plurality opinion of Stevens, 3.).
372. Id. (emphasis original) (citing opinion of Blackmun, J. at 542).
373. Id. (parentheses original).
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merely to any 'statement') 'imposed under State law,' 374 which, if
Justice Blackmun is correct, is not clearly supported either by the plain
language of the amended provision or its legislative history.
In addition to being based on a questionable premise, the plu-
rality's response to the criticism of Justice Blackmun and Justice Scalia
does not adequately address "[t]he most obvious problem with [its]
analysis, [which] is its frequent shift in the level of generality at which
it examines the individual claims."37 As Justice Blackmun explained:
For example, the plurality states that fraudulent-misrepre-
sentation claims (at least those involving false statements of
material fact in advertisements) are "predicated not on a duty
"based on smoking and health" but rather on a more general
obligation-the duty not to deceive," and therefore are not pre-
empted by § 5(b) of the 1969 Act. Yet failure-to-warn claims-
which could just as easily be described as based on a "more
general obligation" to inform consumers of known risks-
implicitly are found to be "based on smoking and health" and
are declared preempted. The plurality goes on to hold that
express warranty claims are not pre-empted because the duty at
issue is undertaken by the manufacturer and is not "imposed
under State law." Yet, as the plurality itself must acknowledge,"the general duty not to breach warranties arises under state
law;" absent the State's decision to penalize such behavior
through the creation of a common-law damages action, no
warranty claim would exist.376
For both Justice Blackmun and Justice Scalia, the problem with
the plurality's methodology was that it was certain to cause difficulty
in the lower courts trying to implement it.377
3. The Amended Preemption Provision Was Not a Substantial
Reworking, as Claimed by the Plurality in Cipollone, and the Changes
Thereto Were Primarily Clarifications to Prevent
the Provision's Circumvention
As noted, the plurality in Cipollone found that "the plain lan-
guage of the preemption provision in the 1969 Act [was] much
broader" than the original Act.37 The plurality based this finding on
374. Id. at 539 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
375. Id. at 543.
376. Id. (parentheses and emphasis original) (citations to plurality opinion of Stevens, J.
omitted).
377. See id. at 543-44; 555 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
378. Id. at 520 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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the fact that "the later Act bars not simply 'statement[s]' but rather'requirements[s] or prohibition[s]."''" The plurality also explained
that "the later Act reaches beyond statements 'in the advertising' to
obligations 'with respect to the advertising or promotion' of cig-
arettes. "380 Further, the plurality determined that the term "State law"
was used instead of "State statute or regulation" because Congress
intended to include more than regulations."' As already suggested by
Justice Blackmun, the plurality's determination that these were sub-
stantial differences materially altering the preemptive scope of the
FCLAA is very questionable.
a. The Change from "Statement" to "Requirement or Prohibition"
Section 5(b) of the original preemption provision read "No state-
ment relating to smoking and health shall be required in the advertising
of [properly labeled] cigarettes."3 2 Section 5(a) used the same phrase
("No statement relating to smoking and health") with regard to cig-
arette labeling.383 It is clear that the 1969 amendment left § 5(a) totally
unchanged.
The phrase "requirement and prohibition" in the amended § 5(b)
is undeniably broader than the term "statement." An important ques-
tion is, then, why Congress made this change. Initially, that answer is
not easily discernible. It may, however, have something to do with the
appellate decision in Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion,384 referenced in the legislative history accompanying the 1969
amendment.38 The Banzhaf case was the only reported case constru-
ing the scope of preemption under the 1965 Act in existence at the
time. In that case, the FCC ruled that radio and television stations
that carry cigarette advertising must devote a significant amount of
broadcast time to presenting the case against cigarette smoking.3 6
The federal court of appeals held that the FCLAA did not
preempt such regulation, finding that Congress simply "did not want
cigarette manufacturers harassed by conflicting affirmative require-
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 523.
382. See FCLAA, Pub. L. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (emphasis added).
383. See id. (emphasis added).
384. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Banzhaf case was discussed earlier. See infra
notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
385. See S. REP. No. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2658.
386. As indicated in the legislative history accompanying the 1969 Act, this was an applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine to cigarette advertising. See S. REP. No. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2658.
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ments with respect to the content of their advertising. "31' The court
found that the term "statement" in § 5(b) of the original preemption
provision meant some type of "affirmative requirement[] with respect
to the content of [the] advertising. ,388
Because of Banzhafs interpretation, Congress may have had
some concerns that states might attempt to impose regulations similar
to the one imposed by the FCC in that case. Clearly, these types of
regulations could also result in the imposition of diverse, nonuniform,
and confusing regulations. To prevent this from happening, Congress
changed the term "no statement" to "[n]o requirement" to ensure that
the provision would not be given such a narrow interpretation. Fur-
ther, as stated by Justice Blackmun, "[i]t is but a small step from
'affirmative requirement' to the converse 'negative requirement'
(prohibition) and from there, to the single explanatory phrase,
'requirement or prohibition." 389
By replacing the word "statement" with the broader phrase"requirement or prohibition," Congress simply sought to ensure that
states could not circumvent the existing provision by enacting legisla-
tion that did not require any particular statement in the advertisement
of cigarettes but that could nevertheless result in the imposition of
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing regulations.9 This was not a
substantive change, but merely a clarification as suggested by the
legislative history.
b. The Phrase "With Respect to the Advertising or Promotion"
The plurality in Cipollone also emphasized the "with respect to
the advertising or promotion" language used in the amended preemp-
tion provision to suggest that this was a substantive change that
illustrated that the preemptive scope of the 1969 Act was greatly
expanded.39' However, there seems little, if any, merit to the plu-
rality's position. This specific language change was clearly mandated
387. 405 F.2d at 1089-90.
388. Id.
389. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 540 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
390. Vango Media provides a good example of a local entity attempting to impose a type of
regulation similar to the FCC's regulation in Banzhaf. As noted, in Vango Media, a city ordi-
nance required advertisers to display one antismoking public health message for every four
tobacco advertisements displayed on city taxi cabs. By requiring advertisers to display certain
messages about smoking and health (other than those required by the FCLAA), the ordinance
risked creating nonuniformity with the federally mandated warning scheme in the FCLAA.
391. The plurality explained that "the later Act reache[d] beyond statements 'in the adver-
tising' to obligations 'with respect to the advertising or promotion' of cigarettes." See Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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because of the other change from "statement" to "requirement or
prohibition."
Section 5(b) of the original FCLAA read "No statement ... shall
be required in the advertising of any cigarettes.... "392 The question
becomes, then, how does it read when the phrase "requirement or pro-
hibition" replaces the term "statement"? That answer is easy: "No
requirement or prohibition ... shall be required in the advertising of
any cigarettes. . . ." It seems clear that the provision could not be left
to read in such fashion. A change in language was necessary to keep
the provision's proper construction. The plurality's suggestion that
the use of the term "with respect to the advertising or promotion" was
deliberately intended by Congress to make the provision broader,
therefore, is an overstatement.
Moreover, the use of the term "promotion" in addition to "ad-
vertising" does not add much. The two terms in many cases can be
used interchangeably. Again, however, the Banzhaf case may provide
an even better explanation. The term "promotion" would probably
apply to the anticigarette messages in that case while the term "adver-
tising" probably would not.393 This provision clarified that Congress
meant that "diverse, nonuniform and confusing regulations" of this
type were also prohibited under the FCLAA.394
As set forth herein, there is a logical explanation for the changes
by Congress following the decision in Banzhaf. The 1969 amend-
ments were meant as a clarification, as is indicated by the accompany-
ing legislative history. The plurality's determination that these were
substantial differences materially altering the preemptive scope of the
FCLAA is most questionable.
c. The 1969 Act's "Based on Smoking and Health"
While the plurality in Cipollone found that the change from
"statement" to "requirement or prohibition" and the insertion of the
"with respect to the advertising or promotion" language in the 1969
Act were substantial differences, it did not reach a similar conclusion
with respect to another change in language. The plurality noted that
the phrase "relating to smoking and health" in the original Act "was
essentially unchanged by the 1969 Act."'3 95 That phrase, however, was
392. See FCLAA, Pub. L. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
393. The same is true of the antismoking messages in Vango Media.
394. The Second Circuit in Vango Media specifically noted that had the original preemp-
tion provision been in effect, the court probably would have been persuaded that the ordinance
was not preempted. See Vango Media, 34 F.3d at 74.
395. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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changed to "based on smoking and health" in the 1969 Act. Contrary
to the plurality's claim, this change was just as important as the other
two.
The original Act preempted any "statement relating to smoking
and health," while the 1969 Act preempted any "requirement or pro-
hibition based on smoking and health." Although a "requirement or
prohibition" may be a broader phrase than "statement," the language
"based on" is clearly not as broad as the language "relating to" in the
original Act. The preemption of a "requirement or prohibition"
therefore is more limited in context.
In Cipollone, the plurality stated that "Congress intended the
phrase 'relating to smoking and health' (which was essentially un-
changed by the 1969 Act) to be construed narrowly."396 The plurality,
however, based this on the legislative history accompanying the 1969
Act.397 That reliance is misplaced for two reasons. First, the Senate
Report referenced by the plurality specifically refers to the phrase
"based on smoking and health," not "relating to smoking and health."
The Senate Report reads, in pertinent part:
The State preemption of regulation or prohibition with respect
to cigarette advertising is narrowly phrased to preempt only
State action based on smoking and health. It would in no way
affect the power of any State or political subdivision of any State
with respect to the taxation or the sale of cigarettes to minors, or
the prohibition of smoking in public buildings, or similar police
regulations. 398
Second, as the plurality in Cipollone itself suggested with regard
to another issue, "the view of a subsequent Congress forms a haz-
ardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." '399 This seems
especially true here, where the language purportedly being construed
is different from the language being referenced by the subsequent
Congress.
Contrary to the plurality's assertion, there is no suggestion that
"Congress intended the phrase 'relating to smoking and health' [in the
original provision] to be construed narrowly." There was no reason to
do so since it simply preempted "statement[s]." However, once the
1969 Act preempted any "requirement[s] [and] prohibition[s]" and
396. Id. (parenthesis original).
397. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652,
2663).
398. S. REP. No. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663 (emphasis
added).
399. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
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not just "statement[s]," Congress did clarify that it wanted the new
provision to be "construed narrowly." Consequently, the language"relating to smoking and health" was changed to "based on smoking
and health." The plurality was wrong to suggest that there was essen-
tially no change in this regard between the 1965 Act and 1969 Act.
Although the 1969 Act may have broadened the term "state-
ment" to "requirement or prohibition," Congress simultaneously nar-
rowed the context of the Act's application by changing the phrase"relating to smoking and health" to "based on smoking and health."
This is supported by the plain language of the phrase "based on smok-
ing and health" and the legislative history accompanying the 1969
Act.
d. The Reason the Term "State Law" Was Used
The original FCLAA contained a blanket preemption provision
related to advertising that was applicable to federal departments and
agencies, as well as to state and local governments. The 1969 Act,
which, as noted, outlawed broadcast advertising of cigarettes, sepa-
rated out congressional direction to the federal administrative agen-
cies,4"' but retained a preemption provision applicable to "state law."
The amended preemption provision preempts any "requirement
or prohibition ... imposed under State law. . ."; Justice Blackmun
correctly conceded "that the phrase 'State law,' in an appropriate case,
can encompass the common law as well as positive enactments such as
statutes and regulations.""4 1  However, in addition to Justice Black-
mun's excellent argument that this phrase, read in proper context,
does not support such a construction, 40 2 the legislative history accom-
panying the amended provision does not support this. Additionally,
there is no other indication that Congress intended to embrace more
than regulations.
The legislative history accompanying the amended preemption
provision indicates that the term "State law" was simply intended to
400. S. REP. No. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663. As noted in
the legislative history, this was accomplished as a new § 7. However, since broadcast advertising
was outlawed, there was no longer any concern about possible action by the Federal Communi-
cation Commission, and the congressional direction was only to the Federal Trade Commission.
See id.
401. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 535 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judg-
ment in part, and dissenting in part).
402. As noted earlier, Justice Blackmun's argument is that this phrase could not be under-
stood without considering the narrow range of action-any "requirement or prohibition"-and
that the dictionary definitions of the terms "requirement" and "prohibition" suggest "specific
actions mandated or disallowed by a formal governing authority." Id. For a more complete dis-
cussion of Justice Blackmun's argument, see infra notes 344-49 and accompanying text.
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ensure the inclusion of political subdivisions. As explained by the
Senate Report:
In some instances, counties or municipalities exercise their
authority over advertising by local ordinances, or regulations, or
even occasionally by resolution. In order to avoid the chaos cre-
ated by a multiplicity of conflicting regulations, however, the
bill preempts State requirements or prohibitions with respect to
advertising of cigarettes based on smoking and health. This pre-
emption is intended to include not only action by State Statute
but by all other administrative actions or local ordinances or reg-
ulations by any political subdivision of any State.4"3
The legislative history also reveals that the amendment to the
preemption provision was made in conjunction with another amend-
ment to the FCLAA, which was adopted "[a]s a perfecting amend-
ment."40 4 In § 3, the Act's definitional section, the 1969 Act added a
sentence to the definition of "State," making made it clear that the
term "State" includes any political division of a State.405
The plurality in Cipollone justified its decision that the term
"State law" was meant to include more than regulations, stating:
[W]hile the version of the 1969 Act passed by the Senate pre-
empted 'any State statute or regulation with respect to ... adver-
tising or promotion,' S. Rep. No. 91-566, p. 16 (1969), the
Conference Committee replaced this language with 'State law
with respect to advertising or promotion.' In such a situation, §
5(b)'s pre-emption of state law cannot fairly be limited to
positive enactments.4°6
The term "State law," however, was used instead of "State statute or
regulation" simply because Congress wanted to ensure the inclusion of
local authority. This explains why there was no "perfecting amend-
ment" with regard to the statement of purpose in § 24° 7-Congress
never intended the preemption provision to embrace anything more
than regulations. The plurality admitted that § 2 "suggested that
Congress was concerned primarily with 'regulations'-positive enact-
403. S. REP. NO. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663.
404. Id.
405. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Pub. L. 91-222, § 3, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as
15 U.S.C. § 1332(3)) (1994); S. REP. NO. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652,
2663.
406. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
407. As noted, § 2 provides that "commerce and the national economy.., not [be] im-
peded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with
respect to any relationship between smoking and health." FCLAA, Pub. L. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat.
282 (1965) (emphasis added).
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ments, rather than common law damages.""4 8 The plurality, however,
was "not persuaded that the retention of that portion of the 1965 Act
was a sufficient basis for rejecting the plain meaning of the broad lan-
guage that Congress added to § 5(b)."4 9  The legislative history
accompanying the 1969 Act, however, also suggests that Congress was
only concerned about regulations and does not support the conclusion
arrived at by the plurality that the term "state law" cannot be limited
to positive enactments.
Use of the term "State law" was simply intended to "make[] clear
that the preemption provision applies to cities, counties, and other
political subdivisions of the States as well as to the States them-
selves."41 There is no basis for the plurality's finding that the use of
this term means anything else.
D. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion in Lindsey Also Has Certain Flaws
1. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's Contention in Lindsey, Cipollone
Does Provide Support for the Location/Content Distinction That
Was First Articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Penn Advertising
The district court in Lindsey reasoned that the resolution was not
preempted by the FCLAA because it only regulated the location, and
not the content, of cigarette advertisements.4 1 The Ninth Circuit,
however, rejected this reasoning. Apparently, the district court relied
on Penn Advertising. That reliance is understandable, since Penn Ad-
vertising addressed the preemption issue in a similar context.
As noted previously, Penn Advertising addressed the issue of
whether a city ordinance prohibiting the placement of any sign adver-
tising cigarettes in a publicly visible location was preempted by the
FCLAA. The Fourth Circuit purportedly applied the methodology
described in Cipollone and held that the ordinance was not pre-
empted.412 The Fourth Circuit's holding was based on the premise
that the ordinance regulated location rather than the content of cig-
arette advertisements.4 3 The court concluded that a regulation with
such a general relationship to cigarette smoking-as opposed to a spe-
cific advertising "prohibition based on smoking and health"-was not
408. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 n.19 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
409. Id. Again, the plurality came to this conclusion despite the fact that both parties
"contend[ed] that the 1969 Act did not materially alter the preemptive scope of [the FCLAA]."
Id. at 520.
410. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-897(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2677.
411. Lindsey, 195 F.3dat 1068.
412. See Penn Advertising, 63 F.3d at 1324.
413. Id.
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preempted.414 The court in essence found that the ordinance's general
prohibition of all cigarette signs was not a "prohibition based on
smoking and health" where it applied irrespective of the nature of the
message communicated.41 The court further reasoned that if the
FCLAA's preemption provision was "to be interpreted so broadly, the
Supreme Court in Cipollone could not have allowed the continued pro-
secution of common law claims for breach of express warranty, misre-
presentation, intentional fraud and conspiracy-all of which relate
generally to the effects on health of promoting the sale of
cigarettes." '416
In Lindsey, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Fourth Circuit "in
Penn Advertising misconstrue[d] Cipollone.""' The Ninth Circuit
found that Cipollone did not support the "location versus content dis-
tinction."41 The court also rejected the conclusions in Penn Advertis-
ing, FAIR, and Giuliani that location restrictions do not lead to the
"diverse, nonuniform and confusing" advertising standards that Con-
gress aimed to prevent by promulgating the FCLAA." 9 Despite the
Ninth Circuit's contention, Cipollone does provide support for the
"location versus content distinction."
The Ninth Circuit is correct that "the Cipollone plurality...
never recognized a distinction between content regulations and others
such as location regulations."42 That observation, however, misses
the point. The plurality in Cipollone made it very clear that the pre-
emption provision must be given "a fair but narrow reading.
421
When the Cipollone plurality addressed the plaintiff's intentional
fraud and misrepresentation claims, it determined that even those
claims that do arise with respect to advertising and promotions, such
as claims based on allegedly false statements of material fact made in
advertisements, were not preempted.422 The plurality found that
"[s]uch claims" were "predicated not on a duty 'based on smoking and
health' but instead on a more general obligation-the duty not to
deceive. 4 23 Crucial to the plurality's reasoning was its finding "that
Congress intended the phrase 'relating to smoking and health' .. . [in
414. Id.
415. See id.
416. Id.
417. Lindsey, 195 F.3d at 1071.
418. Id. The appellate court in Lindsey also noted that the appellate courts in FAIR and
Giuliani drew a distinction between location and content regulations. Id. at 1072.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 1071-72.
421. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524.
422. Id. at 528.
423. Id. at 528-29.
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the original version of the FCLAA's preemption provision]4 24 to be
construed narrowly, so as not to proscribe the regulation of deceptive
advertising. 4 21 "Moreover," the plurality found, "this reading of
'based on smoking and health' is wholly consistent with the purposes
of the 1969 Act. State law prohibitions on false statements of material
fact do not create 'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing' standards. 4 26
In Cipollone, the plurality, therefore, "conclude[d] that the phrase
'based on smoking and health' fairly, but narrowly construed, does not
encompass the more general duty not to make fraudulent state-
ments. ,4 27
Incidentally, it seems even clearer in cases like Penn Advertising,
Lindsey, FAIR, Giuliani, and Reilly that Congress intended the phrase
"based on smoking and health" to be construed narrowly, so as not to
proscribe all of a state's police powers relating to cigarettes and smok-
ing. This appears to have been ignored by the Ninth Circuit in Lind-
sey. An important consideration in these cases, therefore, is whether
the local regulation creates "diverse, nonuniform and confusing stand-
ards." This is the reason why the Fourth Circuit in Penn Advertising
found the city's ordinance, which only regulated "location" and not"content," so important-simply regulating location does not create
the "diverse, nonuniform and confusing standards" that the FCLAA
aims to prevent.
It is clear why the distinction between "location" and "content"
was so important in Penn Advertising and the other cases. The Ninth
Circuit in Lindsey apparently did not understand this point. In fact,
the Ninth Circuit went further and suggested that the different regula-
tions at issue in these cases were "precisely the result Congress was
trying to avoid in promulgating § 5(b)." 428 As set forth below, these
do not appear to be the types of regulations that the FCLAA seeks to
prevent.
424. As noted, the Supreme Court claimed that the phrase "relating to smoking and
health" "was essentially unchanged by the 1969 Act." Id. However, as the 1969 Act's change
from "relating to smoking and health" to "based on smoking and health" clearly made it a nar-
rower provision. See infra notes 395-99 and accompanying text.
425. Id. at 529.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 1072-73.
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2. The Ninth Circuit in Lindsey Ignores the Fact That the FCLAA
Relates to the Prevention of Health-Care Warnings in Advertising,
Which Location Restrictions Clearly Do Not Implicate
After rejecting Penn Advertising's location/content distinction,
the Ninth Circuit suggested that the congressional purpose of the pre-
emption provision supported the preemption of these local restrictions
on tobacco advertising. The court claimed that if every locality "in
this country regulated the location of tobacco advertisement and pre-
scribed certain tombstone formats for availability information signs
like [] in this case, the purpose of the FCLAA would be frustrated
because the national economy would be impeded by diverse, nonuni-
form, and confusing cigarette advertising regulations." '429 Thus, the
court concluded that the regulation's preemption was "not only
mandated by the language of the statute but was also consistent with
the legislative goals that spawned the FCLAA's enactment and subse-
quent expansion.""43 What were "the legislative goals that spawned
the FCLAA?" What type of "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing"
advertising regulations does the FCLAA seek to prevent? Again, the
legislative history of the FCLAA is telling. It shows that the FCLAA
was only meant to prevent "diverse, nonuniform and confusing" ad-
vertising regulations with regard to health-risk warnings in cigarette
advertising, which neither location restrictions nor tombstone formats
appear to implicate.
The legislative history accompanying the original Act makes it
clear that the Act was only intended to preempt any type of "caution-
ary statement" or "health-risk warning" in the labeling or advertising
of cigarettes. It should first be noted that the House Report began
with a section entitled "PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THE BILL"
that only referenced preempting "cautionary statements" in the label-
ing and the advertisements of cigarettes.431 Later, specifically with
respect to "preemption," the House Report indicated as follows:
[The legislation] provides that no cautionary statement with
respect to smoking and health other than specified in this legisla-
tion shall be required on any cigarette package; and that no such
statement with respect to smoking and health shall be required
in advertising for cigarettes packing in conformity with the
labeling provisions of this legislation.432
429. Lindsey, 195 F.3dat 1074-75.
430. Id. at 1075.
431. H.R. REP. No. 449 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350, 2350-51.
432. Id. at 2355 (emphasis added).
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In another portion of the legislative history, it was noted that the pre-
emption provision was intended to "preclude any requirement for a
health-risk warning in cigarette labeling other than that specified in
the [Act] and any health-risk warning requirement for advertising for
cigarettes labeled in conformity of the [Act]. 433
As noted, the 1969 Act strengthened the warning in the original
Act. In the legislative history accompanying it, the "PURPOSE
AND SUMMARY OF THE BILL," which began the Senate Report,
indicated that the 1969 Act "[p]rohibit[ed] health-related regulation or
prohibition of cigarette advertising by any State or local authority. '
The Senate Report also explained that
the State preemption of regulation or prohibition with respect to
cigarette advertising is narrowly phrased to preempt only State
action based on smoking and health. It would in no way affect
the power of any State or political subdivision of any State with
respect to the taxation or the sale of cigarettes to minors, or the
prohibition of smoking in public buildings, or similar police
regulations.43
Moreover, the fact that the amended preemption provision
relates only to health risk warnings is supported by the provision's
language. The provision's use of the phrase "with respect to the ad-
vertising and promotion of cigarettes" must be read in proper context.
In this regard, the provision reads, in pertinent part: "No requirement
or prohibition... with respect to the advertising and promotion of
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
sion of this chapter."'436 The FCLAA's amended preemption provision
pertaining to advertising, therefore, only applies if the cigarette pack-
ages are properly labeled with one of the required warning statements.
The question then, is why this qualification is located in the provision
pertaining to advertising. The answer is not really a difficult one.
This qualification is reflective of the fact that the provision only
applies to advertising and promotions related to health-risk warnings.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Lindsey, in essence, determined
that the FCLAA completely supersedes the Supreme Court decision
in Packer Corp. v. Utah,437 which recognized a state's ability to ban
outdoor tobacco advertising under its police power. Is there evidence
of congressional intent for this? What happened to the assumption
433. Id. at 2356.
434. S. REP. No. 91-566 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2652.
435. Id. at 2663.
436. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (emphasis added).
437. 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
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that federal law does not supersede a state's traditional police powers"unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress? '43  Fur-
ther, what did the legislative history accompanying the 1969 Act mean
when it indicated that the FCLAA's preemption provision was "nar-
rowly phrased?" These questions should have been addressed.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit did not answer them. The court
simply stated that Packer was inapplicable because it pre-dated the
enactment of the FCLAA and because it addressed issues irrelevant to
Lindsey.439 Packer, however, is a recognition that regulations such as
those in Penn Advertising, Lindsey, FAIR, Giuliani, and Reilly have
long been held to lie uniquely within the states' traditional police
powers. The task before the Ninth Circuit in Lindsey was to scrutinize
the relevant statutory language in light of Congress' evident purpose
and pertinent case law in order to determine whether Congress
intended to preempt such regulations.
What the Ninth Circuit's decision amounts to is the lack of a full
understanding of the congressional purpose of the FCLAA. The
FCLAA's legislative history shows that preemption was intended to"avoid the chaos created by a multiplicity of conflicting regulations"
regarding health-risk warnings in cigarette labeling and in the adver-
tising of cigarettes. If this is in fact true, how do simple location
restrictions violate the preemption provision? The Ninth Circuit's
blanket assertion that "a tobacco advertiser is faced with diverse and
nonuniform tobacco advertising regulations depending solely upon the
politics of the locality of the advertising ' certainly does not address
this issue.
In Lindsey, the court's purported reliance on the language, struc-
ture, and history of the FCLAA's preemption provision further misses
the point. The court claimed that the distinction between content
regulations and location regulations could not "be sustained because
the [original] statute only preempted content regulations and the 1969
amendments broaden the scope of preemption beyond state laws that
regulated only the content of tobacco advertisements." '441 The court
also claimed that "[i]n order to distinguish the language currently used
in § [5](a) from the language currently used in § [5](b), § [5](b) must
438. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp. 435 U.S. 497, 504
(1978)).
439. Lindsey, 195 F.3d at 1075. The Ninth Circuit was correct that "[tihe specific issues in
Packer were whether a statewide ban on outdoor tobacco advertisements that left print advertise-
ments unregulated violated the equal protection clause by creating an arbitrary classification,
impermissibly took advertisers' property without due process of law by limiting the freedom of
contract, or constituted an impermissible state regulation of interstate commerce." Id.
440. Id. at 1073.
441. Id. at 1074.
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be read as preempting more than just content regulations. ' ' 4 2 Another
way to read these provisions, however, is simply that the FCLAA pre-
empts "statements" regarding health-risk warnings in cigarette label-
ing and any "requirement or prohibition" regarding health-risk warn-
ings in the advertising of cigarettes. Under this interpretation, the
content/location distinction is important regardless of whether a
statement, requirement, or prohibition is involved.
The Ninth Circuit's suggestion that these local restrictions were
"precisely the result Congress was trying to avoid in promulgating §
[5](b)" is questionable. It seems clear that the FCLAA's preemption
provision was intended to prevent "diverse, nonuniform, and confus-
ing" local regulations regarding health-risk warnings in cigarette label-
ing and in the advertising of cigarettes. In addition, it seems clear that
such a provision was not intended to foreclose all of a state's police
powers with regard to the regulation of tobacco. Location restrictions
do not involve health-risk warnings and appear to be properly within a
state's historic police powers.
Lindsey failed to recognize that the FCLAA was meant to pre-
empt health-risk or health-related requirements or prohibitions "with
respect to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes."' The regula-
tion in Lindsey, and the similar regulations in Penn Advertising, FAIR,
Giuliani, and Reilly did not involve the health-risk or health-related
requirements or prohibitions that Congress sought to prevent by the
FCLAA and, as suggested below, were not "based on smoking and
health" within the meaning of that Act.
3. Lindsey Confuses the Concept of "Public Health"
as a State Police Power with the Phrase "Based
on Smoking and Health" as Used in the FCLAA
The Court in Lindsey found that the resolution banning outdoor
tobacco advertising was "based on smoking and health" because "it
pertain[ed] to matters of health and safety of the citizens of [the
county]. " ' The court also noted that the justifications for the ban on
outdoor tobacco advertising referred to the various health risks associ-
ated with cigarette smoking.445 This however, is only indicative of the
fact that the resolution was a "public health" measure, enacted pursu-
ant to a state police power, and does not necessarily equate to being
"based on smoking and health" within the meaning of the FCLAA.
442. Id.
443. Lindsey, 195 F.3d at 1070.
444. Id.
445. Id.
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The police power is an attribute of sovereignty inherent in every
government.446 It clearly includes the power to adopt and enforce laws
and regulations, including the power of such laws and regulations to
prohibit. Generally, as long as these laws and regulations have a real
and substantial relation to the public peace, health, safety, welfare, or
morals, and are not arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious, or unreason-
able, they will be found valid.447 As a consequence, when a state or
local governmental entity adopts a law or regulation under its police
powers, it typically specifies at least one of these different areas.
Prior to the FCLAA, it could "not [be] denied that the state
[could], under the police power, regulate the business of selling tobac-
co, products ... and the advertising connected therewith." "' Such
power could be used both "to prevent the use of tobacco by minors,
and to discourage its use by adults." '44 9 The states' concern regarding
the use of tobacco products existed long before the FCLAA and the
health concerns that underlie it.4"' It seems ludicrous to suggest that
states lack any power in this regard today because of the discovery of
these health concerns.
In essence, Lindsey determined that the Board's resolution quali-
fied as a "health" prohibition under the FCLAA solely because it had
been enacted under the state's police power. However, that conclusion
is too simplistic. The power to provide for the public health is
designed to promote the public health of the community generally.4"'
The fact that there may have been findings that were included in the
resolution referring to the various health risks associated with cigarette
smoking does not necessarily mean that the resolution was "based on
smoking and health" within the meaning of the FCLAA. The phrase
"based on smoking and health" is clearly referencing a more specific
446. Memorial Gardens Ass'n v. Smith, 156 N.E.2d 587 (Ill. 1959). The police power has
been reserved to all of the states by the Constitution of the United States. Id. Every state has the
power to determine for itself the scope of its police powers and that of its local government enti-
ties. The police power is very broad and not subject to precise definition. See Gundling v. City
of Chicago, 52 N.E. 44 (111. 1898), affd, 177 U.S. 183 (1900) ("The regulation of police power is
hardly susceptible of exact definition."). The power is a fluid and changing entity because it
must respond to political and socioeconomic variations. Professional Investments of America,
Inc. v. McCormick, 469 N.E.2d 1357 (Ohio Misc. 1984).
447. See People v. Chicago, 108 N.E.2d 16 (I11. 952).
448. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 106 (1932).
449. Id. at 106.
450. See id. It had been a state policy since 1890 to prevent the use of tobacco by minors
and to discourage its use by adults. Id. See also Mangini, 875 P.2d at 81 (noting that laws mak-
ing it illegal to sell cigarettes to minors existed long before the health concerns surrounding
cigarettes existed; the states' protective role motivates such law).
451. See Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176, 340, 52 N.E. 44 (Ill. 1898) (noting that the
most important of police powers is that of caring for the health of the community).
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relationship between smoking and health than the regulations involved
in Lindsey and the other cases-it references "legislation that specif-
ically requires or prevents the advertisement of a message concerning
the relationship between smoking and health."4 2
Lindsey used the sole fact that this was a public health measure to
conclude that it was "based on smoking and health."4 3 By this logic,
would the court have found that the FCLAA was not implicated if the
regulation had referenced "welfare" or "public welfare" instead of
"health" or "public health," or if the findings regarding the health
risks had not been included in the resolution? A court surely would
not be bound by the legislature's designation in that regard nor by
whether the findings were included or not. By relying on nothing
more than the fact that the regulation banning outdoor tobacco adver-
tising was a "public health" measure, the conclusion by the Ninth Cir-
cuit that it was therefore a "health" prohibition under the FCLAA is
wholly deficient.
E. Other Thoughts on Lindsey, Cipollone, Federal
Preemption, and the FCLAA
1. The Tombstone Provisions in Lindsey and the Other Cases Do
Not Appear to Violate the FCLAA Despite the Fact That Each Court
Unanimously Found That They Did Violate the Act
As noted herein, the regulations in Lindsey, FAIR, Giuliani, and
Reilly all contained what were referred to as tombstone provisions.454
452. See Reilly, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
453. As suggested earlier, the real question is whether regulations such as those involved in
Lindsey and the other cases are health-risk or health-related requirements, or prohibitions that
Congress sought to prevent by the enactment of the FCLAA.
454. In Lindsey, the regulation banned all tobacco advertisements that could be seen from
the street unless the advertisements were presented in a tombstone format. Under the tombstone
exception, licensed tobacco retailers could post price and availability information outside their
businesses as long as the advertisements were in plain black type on a white field without adorn-
ment, color, opinion, artwork, or logos. No tombstone advertisement, however, could be dis-
played if it was visible from a school, school bus stop, bus stop, or sidewalk regularly used by
minors to get to school or within one thousand feet of a school, playground, or public park.
The tombstone provision in FAIR acted as one of the exceptions to the ordinance in that
case-essentially banning all publicly visible advertising of such products. Under the provision,
any sign that contained a generic description of cigarettes or alcoholic beverages was excepted.
In Giuliani, the ordinance prohibited most outdoor advertising of tobacco products within
one thousand feet of any school building, playground, child day care center, etc. and most indoor
advertising in the same areas if the advertisements could be seen from the street. There was one
exception to the ban: a single, black-and-white, text-only, tombstone sign stating "TOBACCO
PRODUCTS SOLD HERE" could be placed within ten feet of an entrance to a store where
tobacco products were sold.
The regulations in Reilly essentially outlawed (i) advertisements visible from areas likely to be
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In each of these cases, the tombstone provision was found to be
preempted by the FCLAA. Despite this unanimity, these conclusions
appear questionable because the provisions involved were not health-
risk or health-related requirements or prohibitions, which the FCLAA
actually intended to prevent.45 These tombstone provisions may have
been "requirements" or "prohibitions" that were "with respect to ad-
vertising or promotion of cigarettes," but they do not appear to have
been "based on smoking and health" within the meaning of the
FCLAA.
Furthermore, the FCLAA's warning requirement in § 4 is
imposed on manufacturers and importers of cigarettes, not retailers. 456
The Act is meant to apply primarily to brand-specific advertising, not
the general price and availability information by retailers that these
tombstone provisions usually involve. The suggestion that these
tombstone provisions violated the FCLAA because they sidestepped
the required warnings is therefore questionable.
2. It Is Noteworthy That the Smokeless Tobacco Act
Allows State Damages Actions and Regulation of
Outdoor Billboard Advertisements of Smokeless
Tobacco Products by State and Local Entities
As noted previously, the preemption provision in the Smokeless
Tobacco Act4 7 contains a saving clause with respect to state law dam-
ages claims458 and it also provides that the Act's preemption provision
has no application to billboard advertising. 49 The legislative history
accompanying the Smokeless Tobacco Act indicates
that by including provisions in [the Act] which require health
warnings on packages and advertisements for smokeless tobacco
frequented by minors and (ii) certain promotional techniques that purportedly invite illegal
tobacco use by minors. The tombstone regulation did permit retailers to "place one sign no lar-
ger than 576 square inches and containing only black text on a white background stating 'Tobac-
co Products Sold Here' on the outside or visible from the outside of each location where such
products were offered for sale."
455. The same is true with regard to the court's conclusion in the Chiglo case, see infra
notes 140-44 and accompanying text, in that the ordinance in that case that prohibited "point of
sale" advertising was preempted by the FCLAA.
456. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333. In fact, the Act specifically states that the warning requirement
"does not apply to [either] a distributor or a retailer of cigarettes who does not manufacture,
package, or import cigarettes for sale or distribution within the United States." 15 U.S.C. §
1333(d).
457. The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-08 (1994)). For a discussion of the
Smokeless Tobacco Act, see supra note 135.
458. See 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c).
459. See 15 U.S.C. § 4406(b).
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products, and by preempting State and local laws requiring
additional health warnings, it does not intend to preempt a
State's ability to control the promotion or advertising of tobacco
products and does not intend to preempt product liability suits
in State or Federal courts based on failure to warn.46 °
This suggests Congress' disagreement with Cipollone, and further sug-
gests that Congress did not intend the result reached in Lindsey.
3. There Is Probably a More Difficult First Amendment Issue in
These Billboard Cases and the FCLAA Should Not Be Used
with Federal Preemption Principles Solely to Avoid Addressing
the Constitutional Issue
It is clear that the regulations at issue in Lindsey, Penn Advertis-
ing, FAIR, Giuliani, and Reilly also present First Amendment con-
cerns. First Amendment challenges to the regulations were asserted in
all of these cases. However, the appellate courts did not address the
First Amendment issue in Lindsey, FAIR, and Giuliani."' Only the
Fourth Circuit in Penn Advertising and the First Circuit in Reilly ad-
dressed this issue. These two cases suggest that the First Amendment
issue may present a much more difficult issue for the courts than the
preemption one.
The case history of Penn Advertising is noteworthy. In addition
to finding that the ordinance was not preempted by the FCLAA, the
Fourth Circuit also found that it did not violate the First Amend-
ment.462 After the appellate court's decision, the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgment, remanding
the case for further consideration in light of the Court's recent decision
460. S. REP. No. 99-209 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7,13.
461. In Lindsey, the district court found that the regulation at issue was a constitutional
regulation of commercial speech under the First Amendment in addition to not being preempted
under the FCLAA. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the regulation was preempted by the
FCLAA and did not address the First Amendment issue. In both FAIR and Giuliani, the dis-
trict courts did not address the First Amendment issue, finding that the regulations involved
therein were preempted by the FCLAA. The appellate courts in those cases therefore did not
have the First Amendment issue before them.
462. Both the district court and the court of appeals in Penn Advertising applied the test for
assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech as established by the United
States Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S.
557 (1980). Under this test, a court
must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next we ask whether the asserted governmental inter-
est is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
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in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.463 Since 44 Liquormart464 dealt
with alcohol advertising and not cigarette advertising, the FCLAA
was not involved. The Supreme Court's decision in that case was
clearly based on First Amendment grounds.46 In 44 Liquormart, a
plurality of the Supreme Court refused to agree with the assertion that
an advertising ban of liquor prices would significantly advance the
State's interest in promoting temperance.466 That finding appears to
have been an important part of the rationale for the resolution of the
case, and the Supreme Court apparently thought the First Amend-
ment issue merited some consideration in Penn Advertising. However,
after its judgment was vacated and the case was remanded, the Fourth
Circuit in Penn Advertising simply found that "44 Liquormart did not
require [it] to change [its] decision" and readopted its previous deci-
467sion.
The opinion by the First Circuit in Reilly is also noteworthy in
this regard. The opinion devotes more attention to the First Amend-
ment issue and appears to view it as the more serious challenge.468
Although the First Circuit found that it was bound to apply the Cen-
tral Hudson test,469 the court noted that there were "recent rumblings
from members of the Supreme Court and others suggesting that the
Central Hudson test may be in need of minor or major modifica-
tion. '47 This apparently is accurate, as the United States Supreme
463. Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Schmoke, 518 U.S. 1030 (1996). There was no
opinion accompanying the Supreme Court's decision, and the Court simply referenced the 44
Liquormart decision without explanation. This is not an uncommon for the Supreme Court.
464. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
465. In 44 Liquormart, a state law banned the advertisement of retail liquor prices except at
the place of sale. The district court concluded that the ban was unconstitutional because it did
not directly advance the state's asserted interest in the promotion of temperance and was more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 517 U.S. at 494. The court of appeals reversed
the trial court, finding, inter alia, "inherent merit" in the state's argument that competitive price
advertising would ultimately increase sales. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, finding the ban "an abridgment of speech protected by the First Amendment." Id. at
489.
466. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505.
467. 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit did modify the opinion to the ex-
tent that it relied on a certain earlier Supreme Court opinion because of the doubt placed on the
case by the Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart. The Fourth Circuit, however, specifically noted
that the holding in that earlier Supreme Court case was not necessary to its decision upholding
the regulation.
468. Although there is no reference to the tobacco settlement in the First Circuit's opinion,
that settlement should have been entered into prior to the appellate court's rendering of its deci-
sion in Reilly. The tobacco settlement may therefore be an explanation as to why the preemption
issue was not more hotly debated.
469. Intermediate scrutiny is used in commercial speech cases. See supra note 461.
470. Apparently, these members of the Supreme Court advocate giving commercial speech
greater protection than it currently receives under the Central Hudson test.
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Court has agreed to review the dispute in Reilly in order to consider
giving commercial speech broader protection against regulation than is
currently provided for under the intermediate scrutiny traditionally
applied in commercial speech cases.
As noted, this First Amendment issue may be more difficult for
the courts than the preemption issue. That fact, however, should not
justify avoiding such issues under the guise of preemption.
CONCLUSION: THE FCLAA SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO
"IMMUNIZE" CIGARETTE MANUFACTURES FROM STATE LAW
TORT DAMAGES ACTIONS OR ACT AS A "SHIELD"
AGAINST THESE LOCAL REGULATIONS RESTRICTING
CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
As noted, because they involve different contexts, both Cipollone
and Lindsey present different questions regarding the applicability of
the FCLAA's amended preemption provision. Consequently, sepa-
rate conclusions must be made with regard to each.
A. State Common Law Damages Actions
1. The Plurality Decision in Cipollone Was Clearly
a Compromise Decision
With respect to the state common law damages claims, the Su-
preme Court took five different positions with respect to the amended
preemption provision's application. An obvious question, then, is
which position was best.
The Supreme Court took three different positions in Cipollone,
the Third Circuit took a different position from those three, and the
New Jersey Supreme Court took a different position than the Third
Circuit and the Supreme Court. The plurality in Cipollone found that
the language in the amended preemption provision governed, express-
ly preempting certain state common law claims but not others. The
Court also found that there was no need to resort to principles of
implied preemption. Three Justices, led by Justice Blackmun, agreed
that the language in the amended preemption provision governed, spe-
cifically stating that it would be improper to resort to principles of
implied preemption but finding that this provision did not preempt
any state common law damages claims. Two Justices, in an opinion
authored by Justice Scalia, found that the amended preemption pro-
vision expressly preempted all state common law damages claims,
although the Justices specifically objected to the suggestion that resort
to implied preemption would be improper in all cases where there is
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an actual preemption provision. The Third Circuit in Cipollone held
that the amended preemption provision did not expressly preempt
state common law damages claims but that certain of these claims
were impliedly preempted. The New Jersey Supreme Court also
found in Dewey that the amended preemption provision did not
expressly preempt such claims and then, after considering the issue of
implied preemption, further held that there was no implied preemp-
tion as well.
Four of the five different positions appear to be legally defensi-
ble. The one position that is not defensible is the plurality position in
Cipollone-that certain state common law claims were expressly pre-
empted. The plurality's purported finding of express preemption is
questionable to begin with and its further determination that the
amended preemption provision expressly preempted certain state
common law claims and not others makes its position indefensible in
this regard. Although it may be the least defensible of the five posi-
tions, the plurality's position is right in the middle in terms of the final
outcome: It is not as favorable to plaintiffs as the positions taken by
Justice Blackmun and the New Jersey Supreme Court, but it is more
favorable to them than the positions of Justice Scalia or the Third
Circuit.471
The plurality's position in Cipollone does not appear to be the
best position (in terms of legal correctness) with regard to the state law
tort damages claims issue, but it must be understood that it was a
compromise position. As set forth below, of the remaining positions,
the Third Circuit or the New Jersey Supreme Court's are probably the
best with regard to this issue.
2. The Best Positions Are the Third Circuit and
New Jersey Supreme Court's
Justice Scalia's position, that the amended preemption provision
expressly preempts all the state common law damages claims, may be
legally defensible, but it is the weakest of the remaining four positions.
As noted, none of the other lower courts that have considered this
issue found any express preemption of state common law damages
claims by this provision. Nor can it be said that this provision"clearly" or "manifestly" exhibits an intent to preempt such claims.
471. The Cipollone plurality's position was probably closest to the Third Circuit's. Unlike
the Third Circuit, the plurality determined that claims for express warranty and certain fraudu-
lent misrepresentation claims (those involving false statements of material fact in advertisements)
were not preempted at all despite the fact that such claims might arise with respect to advertising
and promotion.
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Justice Blackmun's position that the amended preemption provi-
sion does not expressly preempt these claims is probably the better
position. Justice Blackmun, however, refrained from any further ana-
lysis of this issue. As noted, Justice Blackmun stated that it would be
improper to resort to principles of implied preemption. However, is
this true? Justice Scalia makes a good argument for resorting to prin-
ciples of implied preemption despite the existence of an express
preemption provision. 472
Clearly, the best position would be one that found no express
preemption and then at least considered the possibility of implied pre-
emption. The Third Circuit in Cipollone and the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Dewey both took this position.
The Third Circuit and the New Jersey Supreme Court came to
different conclusions with respect to the whether there was any
implied preemption. As noted, the Third Circuit found that certain
state law claims were impliedly preempted. The New Jersey Supreme
Court found no implied preemption of state law damages claims. The
question remains, which of these two positions is best?
3. Of the Two Positions, New Jersey Supreme
Court's Is Probably Best
Although neither the Third Circuit nor the New Jersey Supreme
Court addressed the preemptive scope of the FCLAA's original pre-
emption provision, a majority of the United States Supreme Court in
Cipollone found that it did not preempt state common law damages
claims. The Court relied on the statement of purpose in § 2 of the Act
for this conclusion. As the Court explained:
This reading comports with the 1965 Act's statement of pur-
pose, which expressed an intent to avoid "diverse, nonuniform,
and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with
respect to any relationship between smoking and health." Read
against the backdrop of regulatory activity undertaken by state
legislatures and federal agencies in response to the Surgeon
General's report, the term "regulation" most naturally refers to
positive enactments by those bodies, not to common-law dam-
ages actions.473
472. A good example for this is the Harshbarger case, involving a state requirement for
tobacco manufacturers to disclose the additive and nicotine-yield rating of their products. How
can one say that the First Circuit was wrong in that case to have engaged in implied preemption
analysis in order to determine whether the state requirement was valid in light of the FCLAA's
ingredient reporting provisions? The only thing one might question is the conclusion reached by
the First Circuit on that issue in finding that there was no implied preemption.
473. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519.
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As noted with respect to the amended preemption provision, the
plurality in Cipollone found that it materially altered the preemptive
scope of the FCLAA. The plurality based this on the fact that the
amended provision barred "requirement[s] and prohibition[s]" and
not simply "statement[s]."' The plurality also explained that the
amended provision "reaches beyond statements 'in the advertising' to
obligations 'with respect to the advertising or promotion' of cig-
arettes.""'' The plurality further determined that the use of the term"state law" meant that Congress intended to preempt more than regu-
lations. Section 2 of the Act, however was not changed by the 1969
Act, and the legislative history accompanying the 1969 Act specifically
indicated that the amendment to the preemption provision was only
meant as a "clarif[ication]. 476 Quite properly, neither the Third Cir-
cuit nor the New Jersey Supreme Court came to the conclusion that
the amended preemption provision materially altered the preemptive
scope of the FCLAA.
With respect to the application of implied preemption, both the
Third Circuit and the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that the
FCLAA did not impliedly preempt those remedies by pervasively
occupying the field. Both courts also agreed that there was no indica-
tion that compliance with both state and federal law was impossible.
The two courts, however, "part[ed] company," as the New Jersey
Supreme Court would say, with respect to whether such claims might"actually conflict" with the purposes of the FCLAA.
The Third Circuit found that the FCLAA "represents a care-
fully drawn balance between the purposes of warning the public of the
hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the national economy.""'
The Third Circuit indicated that "this balance would be upset by
either a requirement of a warning other than that prescribed [by the
Act] or a requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
with respect to the advertising or promotion" of cigarettes.""47  Ac-
cepting the proposition that "state common law damage actions have
the effect of requirements ... capable of creating 'an obstacle,"' the
Third Circuit held: (1) "that the Act preempts those state law damage
actions relating to smoking and health that challenge either the ade-
quacy of the warning on cigarette packages or the propriety of a
party's actions with respect to the advertising and promotion of cig-
arettes" and (2) "that where the success of a state law damage claim
474. Id. at 520.
475. Id.
476. Id. at 523.
477. Cipollone II, 789 F.2d at 187.
478. Id.
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necessarily depends on the assertion that a party bore the duty to pro-
vide a warning to consumers in addition to the warning Congress has
required on cigarette packages such claims are preempted as conflict-
ing with the Act."479
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, was not persuaded by
the conclusions of the Third Circuit, explaining as follows:
The Cigarette Act's statement of policy and purpose announces
two separate goals: (1) "to adequately inform[] [the public] that
cigarettes smoking may be hazardous to health by [the] inclusion
of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes," and (2)
to protect "commerce and the national economy ... to the maxi-
mum extent consistent with this declared policy [by] not im-
ped[ing it with] diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations.' It is significant that the
second goal, the protection of trade and commerce, must be
achieved 'consistent with' and not 'to the detriment of' the first
and principal goal-to inform the public adequately that cig-
arettes may be hazardous to health.48 °
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that allowing state com-
mon law tort remedies would "further, not impair, the goal of ade-
quately informing the public of the risks of cigarette smoking" and it
was only this second goal that could be thwarted if tort claims were
allowed to proceed. After discussing other contexts dealing with the
regulatory effect of state damages actions, the New Jersey Supreme
Court eventually concluded "that had Congress intended to immunize
cigarette manufacturers from packaging, labeling, misrepresentation
and warning claims, it knew how to do so with unmistakable specifi-
city.481
The Third Circuit in Cipollone may be correct that the FCLAA
represents a carefully drawn balance between the purposes of warn-
ing the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the
interests of national economy," 482 but the balance is clearly tilted in
favor of the former. While the primary purpose of the FCLAA is to
warn the public of the consequences of smoking,4 83 the Act's other
goal of protecting "commerce and the national economy .... by not
imped[ing it with] diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette label-
479. Id.
480. Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1248 (citations omitted).
481. Id. at 1251.
482. See 789 F.2d at 187.
483. See H.R. REP. NO. 449 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350 (noting that the
Act's "principal purpose" is to "provide adequate warning to the public of the potential hazards
of cigarette smoking by requiring the labeling of cigarette packages with the [warning]").
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ing and advertising regulations," is clearly secondary.484 From this
perspective, the New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion that there
was no implied preemption of state common law damages claims is the
more compelling.485
B. Local Regulations Restricting Cigarette Advertising
The application of the FCLAA's amended preemption provision
to local regulations such as those in Lindsey, Penn Advertising, FAIR,
Giuliani, and Reilly is even more questionable. First, there is a real
question as to whether the FCLAA's preemption provisions were ever
intended to apply to billboards. As noted, the legislative history of the
FCLAA clearly reflects the fact that this Act was primarily aimed at
television, radio, and print advertising, and not billboard advertising.
The Act did not reference billboards until 1984, well after even the
amended provision was in place. Even then, the Act distinguished
billboards from advertising. In addition, it is clear that the FCLAA
was not intended to prevent these particular types of regulations. As
discussed herein, the amended provision only intended to preempt
health-risk or health-related requirements or prohibitions with respect
to the advertising or promotion of cigarettes, which these advertising
regulations clearly were not.
The cigarette manufactures would have one believe that the pur-
pose of the FCLAA was to immunize them from state law damages
actions and act as a "shield" against local regulations such as those at
issue in Lindsey, Penn Advertising, FAIR, Giuliani, and Reilly. This,
however, is not the case. The FCLAA was clearly not intended to"immunize" cigarette manufacturers by giving them special protection
from state law tort damages claims. It also was not intended to act as a
"shield" against these local regulations. This should not be allowed to
continue and the history of this Act should serve as an important
lesson.
484. As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, this is clear from the Act's statement of pur-
pose. It is also clear from the legislature history of the FCLAA.
485. Especially if one accepts the Cipollone plurality's acknowledgment that there is "no
inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued
vitality of state common-law damages actions." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (Stevens, J. plurality
opinion).
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